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Kelo-Style Failings
ALBERTO B. LOPEZ*
This Article proposes a mechanism to internalize the risk to the public interest
created by the process of land assembly utilized in conjunction with most
eminent domain-related projects. The Article explains how the traditional
bifurcated process of land assembly produces a schism between the land
assembler's acquisition of title and the ability of the land assembler to make a
productive use of the acquired property. The gap of time between title
acquisition and use permits a change of circumstances to thwart the
completion of a redevelopment project, which leaves the public to incur the
costs of post-litigation waste. To internalize the externalities generated by the
typical land assembly process, the Article proposes that land assemblers and
condemning authorities hold title to properties in a land preservation trust
until title to all necessary parcels has been acquired The flexibility of a trust
shields the public, land assemblers, and property owners from objective and
subjective costs stemming from assembling land in the shadow of eminent
domain. By preserving the properties, the trust not only becomes a proxy for
the public utility of redevelopment projects, but also tips the balance of the
public-private process of land assembly toward equipoise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Summer 2011 marked the six-year anniversary of one of the most
controversial Supreme Court decisions from the "Aughts,"' the "iDecade," 2 or
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author wrote this
Article while a Professor of Law at Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University. The author would like to thank Alfred Brophy and Dan Cole for reading prior
drafts of this article and providing helpful commentary. As always, mistakes belong to the
author alone.
I Michael S. Rosenwald, A Decade Is Slipping Away Without Leaving Its Name: The
Aughts? The Ohs? Ugh. Lexicographers Are at a Loss for Words, WASH. POST, Dec. 26,
2009, at C1.
2 Arik Hesseldahl, Apple's iDecade, BLOOMBERG Bus. WEEK (Dec. 31, 2009, 11:27
PM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2009/tc20091231_183323.htm.
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whatever moniker is affixed to the first decade of the twenty-first century-
Kelo v. City of New London.3 Following the Court's holding that economic
development satisfied the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 4 eminent
domain became the legal issue du jour in academic and political circles.
Property scholars pored over the decision to produce a hefty volume of articles.5
Legislatively, twenty-eight states passed bills that curbed the risk of Kelo-style
takings during 2006 alone.6 Furthermore, voters in ten states approved ballot
measures that limited the availability of eminent domain as a means of land
assembly during the 2006 election season.7 Even now, six years after the
decision, state legislators from coast to coast are set to grapple with agendas
that include eminent domain reform and an eminent domain measure is already
slated to appear on Mississippi ballots in November 2011. 8 Regardless of the
3 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). This is not intended to suggest
that Kelo is the most controversial Supreme Court decision of the last decade. Other
controversial decisions issued by the Court during the period from 2000 to 2010 include
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (striking down the District of
Columbia's ban on handguns in private homes on Second Amendment grounds), Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the state's ban on sodomy violated an
individual's liberty interest protected by substantive due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (ruling that the procedure implemented by
Florida to recount votes in the contested presidential election violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
4 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
5 For an extensive list of articles that address eminent domain post-Kelo, see DAVID L.
CALLIES, PUBLIC USE AND PUBLIC PURPOSE AFTER KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 75 app. C
(2008).
6 John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2006, at Al (stating that state legislators banded together "in a rare display of unanimity" to
support eminent domain reform in a manner "that cut[] across partisan and geographic
lines"). For the number of bills enacted after the holding in Kelo, see Eminent Domain: 2006
Legislation, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 12, 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=l 7593.7 Property Rights Issues on the 2006 Ballot, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabid=l7595 (last visited Nov. 3,2011).
8 See, e.g., Callegari Files Legislation to Restrict Tax Increases, Eminent Domain,
KATY TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.katytimes.com/articles/
2010/11/17/news/doc4cel 52586d0d 1065865359.txt; Government Accountability: Protecting
Private Property from Eminent Domain Abuse, AT'"Y GEN. WASH., http://www.atg.wa.gov/
uploadedFiles/Home/OfficeInitiatives/LegislativeAgenda/20 10/EminentDomainAbuse.
pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Wa. AG, Eminent Domain Abuse]; House Bill 8
Information/History, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/
BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2011 &BiIlID=H8 (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
Furthermore, voters have recently decided ballot measures in other states. See, e.g., Phil
West, Mississippi Governor to Veto Eminent Domain Legislation, COM. APPEAL (Memphis),
Mar. 24, 2009, at B3; Eminent Domain 2008 Ballot Measures, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabld=13244 (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (describing
California's Proposition 99); Matt Gouras, House Gives First Approval to Eminent Domain,
INDEP. REC. (Feb. 5, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://helenair.com/news/article_71a660a6-30fl-
I leO-a756-001cc4cOO2eO.html; Doug McMurdo, Voters Reject Changing Judge Selection,
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form of reform, Kelo stamped its footprint on the law of eminent domain in
almost every jurisdiction in the country.
Lost amid the post-Kelo maelstrom, the ruling has a more visible legacy in
the city of New London, Connecticut. The ninety acres of land acquired by New
London, including the Fort Trumbull neighborhood once located at the
epicenter of Kelo, remain entirely undeveloped almost six years after the
Court's decision. 9 The project floundered because the developer chosen by the
New London Development Corporation failed to secure financing for the
project. 10 As a result, the "urban village"" envisioned by New London's
redevelopment plan that was supposed to include a hotel, health club, high-end
condominiums, and office space never materialized. 12 According to one report,
"[b]arren weed fields are all that exist where homes once stood."'13 Ingeniously,
one op-ed invoked Joni Mitchell to describe the whole affair: "they take
paradise and put up an empty lot."'1 4 To make matters worse, Pfizer Inc., widely
viewed as the primary beneficiary of New London's exercise of eminent
domain, 15 announced in late 2009 that it intended to vacate its New London
facility. 16 Once Pfizer leaves, New London will have an additional abandoned
building to add to the "empty lot" of overgrown weeds as a memorial to the
LAS VEGAS RiEv.-J. (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.lvrj.com/news/voters-reject-
changing-judge-selection- 106597233.html.
9 See Jeff Benedict, Taken in Vain: With Pfizer Leaving, City Has Nothing but Weedy
Acres to Show for Grandiose Development Scheme that Uprooted Homeowners and Razed a
Neighborhood, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 15, 2009, at C 1; see also Jeff Benedict, Apology
Adds an Epilogue to Kelo Case (Sept, 18, 2011), http://articles.courant.com/2011-09-
18/news/hc-op-justice-palmer-apology-20110918_lepilogue-justice-palmer-s-susette-kelo
(recently, one of the justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court apologized to Susette Kelo
and stated that he would have voted differently if he had known about the future failure to
develop the site, which he could not have known at the time).
10Kathleen Edgecomb, NLDC Considering Proposal for Townhouse Project at Fort
Trumbull, THE DAY (New London), Feb. 10, 2010, at A3 ("Corcoran Jennison lost its
preferred-developer status after failing to meet a deadline to secure financing for the
residential component of the plan. The developer blamed the faltering economy for its
difficulties."); William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes
Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at Al ("One point of contention: Corcoran Jennison is
resisting pressure from the city to build a waterfront hotel first, as was initially planned, out
of concern that there is no market for one.").
II Editorial, A Redevelopment Sand Castle: On the Aftermath of a Supreme Court
Ruling, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 28, 2009, at Al 1.
12See Edgecomb, supra note 10; Yardley, supra note 10.
13 Benedict, supra note 9; see also Edgecomb, supra note 10; Patrick McGeehan,
Pfizer to Leave City that Won Land-Use Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at Al (describing
the property acquired via Kelo as a "swath of barren land that was cleared of dozens of
homes to make room for a hotel, stores and condominiums that were never built"); Yardley,
supra note 10.
14 Editorial, supra note 11.
15 See Eric Gershon, Pfizer Inc. to Vacate New London R&D Center: Moving to
Groton, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 10, 2009, at Al; McGeehan, supra note 13.
16See, e.g., McGeehan, supra note 13.
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Court's famous, or maybe infamous, decision to permit New London to take
"paradise."
Kelo, however, is not the most recent example of a development project that
utilized eminent domain as a means of land assembly that failed to get off of the
ground, literally, after "public use" litigation. The facts of Norwood v. Homey
bear a striking resemblance to those of Kelo: flagging local economy, a
redevelopment plan involving the acquisition of private property by eminent
domain for purposes of economic development, and litigation to determine the
scope of public use. 17 Norwood, however, differs from Kelo in two crucial
aspects. The Norwood plaintiffs chose to challenge the city's action under the
public use clause of the Ohio Constitution rather than pursue a challenge under
the federal Constitution.18 More importantly, the homeowners in Norwood fared
better than the Kelo plaintiffs-the Norwood plaintiffs won their claim.19 In a
decision issued almost one year to the day after Kelo, the Supreme Court of
Ohio unanimously agreed that "economic or financial benefit alone" failed to
satisfy the public use clause under Ohio's Constitution.20 After losing Kelo by a
vote of 5-4, property rights advocates championed the Norwood ruling as a
"homerun for homeowners." 21
17 Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). At the time of the
case, the city had a $3.6 million deficit on its books and reduced bus and recreational
services as cost-saving measures. See Merit Brief of Appellee Rookwood Partners, Ltd. at 6,
Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) (Nos. 05-1210 & 05-1211); see also
Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1124 (Ohio 2006) (The developer planned to
construct over 200 residences and more than 500,000 square feet of office and retail space in
Norwood, which was estimated to add $2 million per year to city coffers.).
18 Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1122-23. The relevant section of the Ohio Constitution is
Section 19, Article I which states that:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.
When taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively requiring its
immediate seizure, or for the purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be open
to the public, without charge, a compensation shall be made to the owner, in money,
and in all other cases, where private property shall be taken for public use, a
compensation therefor shall first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit of
money, and such compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for
benefits to any property of the owner.
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 19.
19 Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1142-53 (holding that Norwood's exercise of eminent
domain for "economic benefit alone" violated the protection afforded private property
owners under the Ohio Constitution).2 0 Id.
21 Gregory Korte, Norwood Loses Case on Property Seizures, CIN. ENQUIRER, July 27,
2006, at Al (quoting the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation). For further positive commentary,
see, for example, Steve Kemme, Norwood Site to Stay Vacant for Now, CIN. ENQUIRER, July
29, 2006, at Al (reporting that one of the attorneys in the case described the decision as "a
complete vindication... of the rights of every home and business owner in the state").
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Despite the legal victory for private property owners in Ohio, the proposed
development site in Norwood looks eerily similar to that in New London-the
properties have not been developed since the litigation ended almost five years
ago.22 Two years after the litigation, the developer reached a deal to purchase
the properties owned by the victorious Norwood holdouts23 and demolished the
structures on those properties shortly thereafter. 24 However, the duration of the
land assembly process proved too long for the prospective commercial tenants
of the yet-to-be constructed buildings. As a result, the would-be tenants leased
commercial property at a different location, which left the proposed
development without any tenants for the buildings to be constructed on the
site.25 Ground has yet to be broken for development and the area has become
nothing more than an expanse of "high grass and weeds." 26 One local resident
described the site as "horrible, absolutely horrible," while another suggested
that the city should "plant corn there and sell it" instead of letting the area lie
fallow.27 Given the present state of the properties at issue in Norwood, the
Supreme Court of Ohio's decision was not a "homerun for property owners," 28
but more like a bloop single-a Kelo-style failing.29
The invisible, and ultimate, loser as a result of Kelo-style failings is the
public. Unlike developers and property owners who obtain title to land or
22 See Steve Kemme, Owner's Legal Victory Leaves Land in Limbo, CIN. ENQUIRER,
July 22, 2008, at Al. Following the decision, several homeowners continued to holdout by
refusing to sell their properties voluntarily to the developer. As a result, "a tall chain-link
fence enclose[d] three forlorn homes like farm houses in ... weeds." Peter Bronson, The
Eminent Domain Superheroes of Norwood, CIN. ENQUIRER, Aug. 8, 2006, at B7.
23 Steve Kemme, Eminent Domain Holdout Sells for $1.25M, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 4,
2008, at Al.
24 Laura Baverman, Delayed Project to Start in Spring, CIN. ENQUIRER, Nov. 3,
2009, at Al.25 Lisa Bernard-Kuhn, Kenwood's Comeback, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 16, 2007, at El
("[T]roubles surfaced for the planned Rookwood expansion and legal battles ensued over
Norwood's use of eminent domain to secure neighboring homes and commercial properties
for the development. Last year, the Ohio Supreme Court sided with home owners, and today
the site houses two vacant houses surrounded by chain-linked fencing. 'Had the Rookwood
scenario gone the other way, maybe you would have seen some other things happen there
rather than at Kenwood,' said Rob Molloy, Sycamore Township administrator. 'Crate &
Barrel is a prime example. We heard several times that it was going to be at Rookwood, but
it ended up here."'); Cliff Peale, Crate & Barrel Heads to Kenwood, CIN. ENQUIRER, Nov.
30, 2006, at Al ("Crate & Barrel had long been rumored to be headed to a new Rookwood
development in Norwood, but that site was delayed by legal wrangling over the city's right
to take the site by eminent domain.").26 Kernme, supra note 23.
27 Kemme, supra note 22.
28 1d.
29 According to newspaper accounts, the developer announced plans to initiate building
in Spring 2010. As of this writing, however, no construction has begun and no soil has been
turned. See Baverman, supra note 24.
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money,30 the public receives nothing after the legal process has run its course
and the land necessary for development has been assembled. Instead, the public
is left with an empty patch of land that not only threatens to reduce tax revenue
of taken as well as neighboring plots of land, but also drains a valuable stream
of commerce as residents pack up and move elsewhere. 31 Beyond the financial
costs to the public, the ruin created by the cycle of negotiation, acquisition, and
destruction without subsequent development serves as a visible blot on the
public consciousness. Consequently, a regrettable irony exists-the public in
whose name the development project that invoked eminent domain was initiated
receives nothing as a result of the takings.
Although its sheer volume is eye-catching, the overwhelming majority of
post-Kelo legislation fails to protect the public from suffering the ill-effects of
Kelo-style failings. As a general matter, most post-Kelo reforms represent a full
frontal assault on Kelo by excluding economic development or post-acquisition
transfer of property to private parties from the definition of public use.32
Narrowing the definition of public use, however, does not inoculate the public
against Kelo-style failings because many states retained exceptions from the
newly minted restrictions if eminent domain is used to eradicate "blight. '33 The
shortcoming of such reforms is that a precise definition of blight cannot be
crafted to lessen the risk to which the public is exposed. For example,
Pennsylvania's pre-Kelo definition of blight included property that was
"unsafe," "unsanitary," plagued by "defective design," or suffering from a "lack
of proper light and air and open space."'34 After Kelo, Pennsylvania "improved"
30 This is not intended to diminish the hardship suffered by some property owners
forced to relocate as a result of eminent domain. Rather, the statement merely reflects that
such homeowners receive something in exchange for their properties even if it is not the
equivalent of what has been lost.
31 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 934, 955 (2003).32 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c) ("Private property taken by eminent domain
pursuant to a petition to initiate condemnation proceedings filed on or after January 2, 2007,
may not be conveyed to a natural person or private entity except as provided by general law
passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the Legislature."); MICH.
CONST. art. X, § 2 ("'Public use' does not include the taking of private property for transfer
to a private entity for the purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax
revenues."); N.H. CONST. art. 12-a ("No part of a person's property shall be taken by
eminent domain and transferred, directly or indirectly, to another person if the taking is for
the purpose of private development or other private use of the property."); S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 13(A) ("Private property must not be condemned by eminent domain for any purpose or
benefit including, but not limited to, the purpose or benefit of economic development, unless
the condemnation is for public use."). For a definitional modification, see, for example, Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
33 Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REv. 2100, 2120-31 (2009). For a history of the relationship between blight and
eminent domain, see Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal
and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (2003).
34 35 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1702(a) (West 2011).
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its definition by adding factors such as "vermin infested" or a "haven for
rodents" to the list of qualities that identify "blighted property. '35 Such
malleable characteristics cannot be cabined to distinguish blighted from non-
blighted property; no meaningful distinction exists between a "haven for
rodents" and a locale that is just casually popular among rodents. In short, the
ambiguous definition of blight casts considerable doubt on the utility of public
use reforms.36
The speed with which legislatures enacted post-Kelo reforms is not
surprising given the popular backlash against the decision-and the failure to
enact more stringent post-Kelo reforms is not surprising either. In an age where
political decisions are made by reference to public opinion polls, politicians
could not ignore the nearly unanimous condemnation of the decision reflected
in poll after poll. Local governments around the country, however,
counterbalanced public rancor by opposing muscular eminent domain
reforms.37 As public choice theory would predict, a Solomon-like compromise
resulted from the tug-of-war between these interests.38 Politicians passed
reforms aimed precisely at Kelo-style takings, which quelled the public clamor
for change, but the reforms also provided an escape hatch by leaving blight as a
permissible foundation to exercise eminent domain.39 Notably, the takings in
Kelo were not premised on the blight of the properties, which kept the blight
3526 id. § 205(b)(1)-(12).
36 Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent
Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709, 725 (stating that "[d]efinitions of 'blight' are
generally vague enough to allow condemnation of almost any property"); Ilya Somin,
Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 183, 266 (2007) (commenting that "[a] sufficiently expansive definition of
blight is essentially equivalent to authorizing economic development takings"). Despite the
apparent protection offered to property owners on the face of the statutes, some of the new
laws included qualifying language that diminished the strength of the reform. Texas, for
example, prohibited condemnations for "economic development purposes, unless the
economic development is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal community
development." See TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (West 2008). Distinguishing
between a primary and "secondary" purpose of eminent domain is an exercise in semantics.
See also, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-2(a)(ii) (Lexis 2010) (barring the exercise of
eminent domain "primarily for economic development"). Among the most comprehensive
post-Kelo statutory protections are those created in Florida and New Mexico. The post-Kelo
reforms in those states not only bar eminent domain for purposes of economic development,
but also ban its use to eradicate blight. See Act of May 11, 2006, ch. 2006-11, 2006 Fla.
Laws 214; Act of Apr. 2, 2007, ch. 330, 2007 N.M. Laws 3873.
37 See, e.g., Dan Walters, Eminent Domain Bills Are Stalled-Except One for Casino
Tribe, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 16, 2005, at A3 (describing efforts to block eminent domain
reform in California); Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2006, at B I (containing comments regarding the utility of limiting eminent domain
as a tool for development).
38 Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain's1 "Summer of Scrutiny, " 59




standard under the public's radar and permitted legislators to exempt blight
from post-Kelo restrictions. Thus, each side could claim a victory of sorts and
political attention could turn to the next legislative fire.40
If blight is a loophole in post-Kelo eminent domain reforms, then local
governments should be expected to exploit that loophole by substituting blight
takings for economic development takings. To that end, post-Kelo evidence of
the usage of blight as a pretext for an economic development taking is readily
available. Missouri, for example, modified its public use definition in 2006 by
excluding economic development from the permissible uses for eminent
domain, but retained an exception for the elimination of blight.41 In 2007,
Kansas City sought to redevelop an area by designating it as "blighted" even
though some of the parcels within that area were not blighted.42 Although the
owner of the non-blighted property challenged the action in court, a Missouri
appellate court upheld Kansas City's exercise of eminent domain.43 Recently,
several Wisconsin cities have sought to deploy eminent domain for purposes of
blight elimination even though the underlying purpose of the takings is
allegedly economic development. 44 Furthermore, a post-Kelo study of eminent
domain in Washington concluded that its blight standard threatened to sweep
just about any property into the eminent domain net.45 Supporting its
conclusion, the study detailed the usage of blight as a justification for eminent
domain "with the idea of tearing down the homes and transferring the property
to developers to build 'urban villages."' 46 Ironically, New London also
promoted its now-defunct development plan by describing the end product as an
urban village.
Recognizing the risk carved out by the blight loophole, a number of state
legislatures planned to visit or revisit the definition of blight during 2011. In
fact, New Jersey's legislature considered, and rejected, an amendment to its
definition of blight during the first month of 2011.47 With almost as much
40 d.
41 See Mo. REv. STAT. § 523.271 (2011).
42 Allright Props., Inc. v. Tax Increment Fin. Comm'n of Kan. City, 240 S.W.3d 777,
778-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
4 3 Id. at 782.
44 See Nicholas Penzenstadler, City Set To Take Family's Land, MILWAUKEE J.-
SENTINEL, June 10, 2009, at 1A. For a similar case from Wisconsin, see Sean Ryan, Blight
Declaration Could Wipe Out Oak Creek Farm, DAILY REP. (Milwaukee), May 7, 2010, at
1A. Eventually, political pressure forced the local authorities to drop the plan of acquisition
by eminent domain. See Mark Schaaf, City Uproots Plan for Buying Farm, OAK CREEK
NOW, June 3, 2010, at 1.
45 William R. Maurer, A False Sense of Security: The Potential for Eminent Domain




4 7 Legislative Recap, N.J. LEAGUE MUNICIPALITIES (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.njslom.org/letters/ml0111 1-leg-advisory.html. For the text of the bill that failed
[Vol. 72:4
KELO-STYLE FAILINGS
alacrity, a Wisconsin state senator announced that she plans to introduce a bill
to refine the state's definition of blight in response to the attempted blight
takings in her state. 48 If the proposal is enacted, Wisconsin's definition of blight
will have changed twice in the six years since Kelo.49 Given the findings in
Washington, the Attorney General's Office asked state legislators to amend the
definition of blight in the Community Renewal Law during the 2011 legislative
session because it "allows [] and even encourages" local authorities to use
eminent domain as a means to assemble land for private benefit.50 But if these
legislative changes track those made in Kelo's wake, the end result will be
nothing more than an additional group of factors that remain ambiguous enough
to mask an economic development taking.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an area unquestionably falls
within the definition of blight, exercising eminent domain to eradicate blight
threatens the public interest in the same way as an economic development
taking. For example, one of the most controversial projects employing eminent
domain as a means of land assembly at present is Brooklyn, New York's
Atlantic Yards project, a massive redevelopment project that includes an arena
for the NBA's New Jersey Nets. 51 Condemning authorities justified the exercise
of eminent domain by labeling the area to be acquired as blighted and that
designation survived a legal challenge that made its way to the New York Court
of Appeals. 52 Development, however, has not proceeded quickly and "[a] hole
grows in Brooklyn" that represents "the beginnings of the failure of a massive
government plan to revive the.., neighborhood. ' 53 If circumstances emerge
that impede construction, the redevelopment area will take on the appearance of
the "holes" in New London or Norwood.54
This Article argues that the traditional process of land assembly generates
externalities that threaten to produce post-litigation waste and proposes a
mechanism to internalize those externalities. The next part of this Article
explains how the traditional two-step process of land assembly creates a schism
between transfer of title and productive use of the property that imperils the
in New Jersey, S1451, see S. 1451, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
2010/Bills/S 1500/145 1_R2.pdf.
48 Press Release, Mary Lazich, Lazich to Reform Eminent Domain, Blight Laws (Aug.
17, 2010), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/sen28/news/Press/2010/pr2010-
034.asp.
49 Id.
50 Wa. AG, Eminent Domain Abuse, supra note 8. The bills were introduced during the
2010 legislative session, but failed to obtain sufficient support to proceed through the
legislative process. Despite the setback, the bills have been reintroduced during the 2011
legislative session.
51 Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Empire State Dev. Corp., No. 114631/09, 2010
WL 936220, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2010).
52 1d. at *8.
53 Julia Vitullo-Martin, A Hole Grows in Brooklyn, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2009, at A9.54 Presumably, property in Brooklyn will attract more developers interested in the
property than the areas subject to redevelopment in New London and Norwood.
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public interest. Part III of this Article evaluates two recent scholarly proposals
that offer alternatives to traditional eminent domain land assembly-the land
assembly district (LAD) and secret purchases of land within areas targeted for
redevelopment. Because both are likely to utilize the bifurcated process of land
assembly eventually, post-litigation waste remains a possibility. To internalize
the costs of land assembly, Part IV proposes that land assemblers and
condemning authorities hold title to acquired properties as co-trustees of a land
preservation trust (LPT). This part of the Article argues that combining
narrowly tailored co-trustee powers with the duties imposed upon co-trustees
promotes the interests of the public, land assemblers, and property owners by
maximizing the flexibility with which co-trustees may respond to changing
circumstances. The Article concludes that the LPT's protection of the public
interest not only serves as a proxy for the utility of redevelopment projects, but
also tilts the scales of the public-private partnership model of land assembly
toward equipoise.
II. LAND ASSEMBLY AND THE RISK TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Property scholarship brims with analysis that examines the efficiency of
transactions-the allocation of rights to parties that place the highest value on
the things to which those rights attach.55 In one of the most influential articles
of the last fifty years, The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase posited that
resource allocation was independent of the assignment of legal entitlements in
the absence of transaction costs. 56 In other words, bargaining parties distribute
resources efficiently regardless of the assignment of legal rights if the costs of
reaching an agreement are zero. To illustrate the point, Coase used a series of
binary relationships to conclude that two parties could bargain around the law if
transaction costs do not impede bargaining. Coase's examples included a cattle
rancher and an owner of neighboring land, confectioner-adjacent doctor's office
with a common wall, manufacturer and nearby business, and polluter-pollution
sufferer. 57 Multiple individuals may be present on each side of the efficiency
equation, but each side of that equation only has one interest group; the
efficiency-promoting transaction is binary.58
The relationship between the binary paradigm and efficiency is reflected in
an array of property doctrines. 59 To demonstrate that a given doctrine promotes
55 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (7th ed. 2007). This is not to
say that efficiency is the only factor that influences the direction of property law. Fairness is
also an important factor in many decisions.
56 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-8, 15 (1960).
57 Id. at 2-15.
58 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 40-81 (1991) (illuminating
Coase's ideas in the real world by analyzing the binary relationship between cattle ranchers
and farmers).




efficiency, analysis focuses on the immediate parties to the transaction and the
immediate uses of the property made by each of the parties to the binary
transaction. Adverse possession, for example, creates a new title in a trespasser
if the trespasser makes a productive use of the land for a statutory period of time
without being ejected by the true owner of the land.60 Similarly, the law of
waste prevents present possessors, such as legal life tenants, from using
property in a way that depreciates the value of the future interests in the
property. 61 Breaking the efficiency analysis into its components, adverse
possession examines the relationship between owner-trespasser while the
relationship between present possessor-holder of future interest is the focus of
the law of waste. As a general matter, efficiency compares the wealth-
maximizing uses of two parties and allocates property rights according to the
party that will make the most productive use of the property.
Implicit in the binary transactions in both positive law and scholarship is
that an efficient transaction between two bargaining parties promotes the
interest of an invisible third party beneficiary-the public. Social welfare is
maximized as a byproduct of efficient bargains struck by two parties. Adverse
possession, for example, enhances public wealth by creating a new title to land
in a trespasser who makes a more productive use of the property than the
owner.62 Coase's cattle ranchers and farmers may reach agreement despite legal
entitlements, thereby distributing resources efficiently in the absence of
bargaining costs. 63 The public benefit is tangential to the benefits accruing to
the immediate parties to the transaction.
Like other areas of property law, efficiency stands at the heart of eminent
domain.64 Eminent domain provides a mechanism for land assembly when
market transactions fail to aggregate title to property necessary for a given
project. 65 Indeed, the market rarely succeeds in assembling title to all necessary
6 0 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 119 (7th ed. 2010).
6 1Id. at 217-18.
62 1d. at 119.
63 Coase, supra note 56, at 15 (referring to his transaction-free analysis as a "very
unrealistic assumption"). Even Coase recognized that a world without transaction costs was
a figment of the imagination.
6 4 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888) ("Apart from constitutional considerations, it is not
essential, in order to constitute an act of eminent domain, that the use for which the property
is taken should be of a public nature. It is sufficient that the use of the particular property is
necessary to enable individual proprietors to cultivate and improve their land to the best
advantage or to develop certain natural and exceptional resources incident thereto .... In
such cases the public welfare is promoted, though indirectly, by the increased prosperity
which necessarily results from developing the natural resources of the country."). For
articles addressing eminent domain and efficiency, see generally Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871 (2007); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61 (1986).65 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 1203,
1231 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (asserting that eminent domain is employed to combat holdout
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parcels of land because some property owners hold out by refusing to sell their
properties. Part of the cost of holding out is not borne by holdout owners; it is
externalized to the public.66 Economic development takings, for example, are
typically premised on the creation of jobs and increased tax revenues that
improve social welfare. Holdouts delay the public's reception of these benefits.
Similarly, the economic toll that blight takes on neighboring property owners
and the community outweighs the right of the property owner to retain title to
the land. In economic terms, eminent domain is the government's tool to reduce
the externalities to which holdouts expose the public.
To minimize these externalities, eminent domain aggregates title to
properties in areas designated for redevelopment using both voluntary and
involuntary mechanisms. Prior to filing an eminent domain petition, private
land assemblers attempt to acquire title by voluntary agreement with property
owners in areas selected for acquisition and subsequent development. Once
voluntary negotiations have reached a stalemate, the condemning authority
enters the land assembly process to acquire title to holdout properties via
eminent domain. The land assembly process in Norwood is an exemplar of the
standard land assembly script-land assembler secures title to some, but not all,
properties, and the government, or its agent with the delegated power of
eminent domain, subsequently intervenes, seeking to acquire title to holdout
properties by eminent domain. 67
Condemning authorities prefer this two-step approach to land assembly
because the voluntary phase of acquisition avoids public assumption of costs
associated with obtaining title to numerous parcels of land by eminent
domain. 68 This preference for voluntary acquisition is codified in most states in
problems associated with land assembly); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and
the Single Owners: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 572 (1993)
(noting that eminent domain is "typically" used when holdouts prevent the assembly of land
necessary for projects); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle,
80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1561, 1570 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)) (observing that eminent domain
has been used "to promote efficient allocation of resources by overcoming holdouts and free
riders").66 For a definition of an externality, see, for example, RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM,
THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 24 (1988) ("An externality is... defined as the effect of one
person's decision on someone who is not a party to that decision.").
67 Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) ("Early on,
Rookwood repeatedly pressed Norwood to invoke its eminent-domain powers, but each
request was denied. Alternatively, Norwood urged Rookwood to privately acquire the
renewal area without legislative intervention. Norwood was so adamant that the city required
Rookwood to document its acquisition efforts. But the owners remained recalcitrant,
rebuffing Rookwood's purchase offers.").
68 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 605 (2005) (commenting that "the government will often choose to secure consensual
agreement over going to court" because of the expense of litigation); Merrill, supra note 64,
at 80 (stating that "when governments acquire interests in land they prefer, if possible, to do
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statutes that require condemning authorities or their delegates to attempt to
purchase the property by negotiation before seeking acquisition by eminent
domain. 69 The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Act, for example, requires pre-condemnation negotiations to occur before the
onset of litigation.70 The principal justification for statutes that require pre-
eminent domain negotiations between purchaser and property owner is that
voluntary transfers avoid litigation. 71 Construing its negotiation statute in 1865,
which required "a fair and honest attempt" at agreement, the Supreme Court of
California asserted that the purpose of pre-litigation negotiation was "to prevent
a waste of money by needless litigation." 72 In short, private transfers are
preferred because they conserve not only public, but also judicial, resources.
But if pre-condemnation transfers are efficient transactions between the
parties and eminent domain promotes the efficient allocation of resources, 73
aggregating transactions that are theoretically efficient in isolation should be
expected to net an efficient result. In other words, efficiency plus efficiency
should at least equal efficiency. However, the post-litigation uses of the land in
cases like Kelo and Norwood cannot be characterized as efficient uses of
property. To the contrary, vacant property is a visible sign of economic waste in
so by market transactions. Government officials frequently complain about the costs and
delays of eminent domain.").69 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 18-1A-55 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505 (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-1-9 (2010); IND. CODE § 32-24-1-3 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.55
(2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-6 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-70 (2010); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 25.1-204 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 8.26.180 (2010).
70 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970
§ 301,42 U.S.C. § 4651 (2006).
716 Julius L. Sackman, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.13(1)(a) (rev. 3d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter NICHOLS] ("In order to serve the public policy goal of reducing the cost of
eminent domain actions by reducing associated litigation expenses, most states now require
that the condemnor undertake good faith efforts to negotiate a purchase price with the owner
of the land sought to be condemned before initiating formal condemnation proceedings.").72 Lincoln v. Colusa Cnty., 28 Cal. 662, 667 (1865); see also, e.g., Columbia v.
Baurichter, 713 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. 1986) ("The negotiation requirement of the Missouri
condemnation statute was enacted to prevent needless litigation when fruitful negotiations
between the owner and the condemner could occur."); 6 NICHOLS, supra note 71, § 24.13
n.48 (noting that Model Eminent Domain Act § 306 states that the negotiation requirement
protects "property owners from arbitrary and unexpected exercises of eminent domain
power, facilitat[es] ... amicable settlement of disputes as to the amount of just
compensation, minimize[s] acquisition costs through reduction of litigation and
promot[es] ... citizen cooperation with governmental programs involving land
acquisitions").
73 Some number of pre-condemnation transfers of title may not be strictly efficient even
though title changes hands. An owner may decide to sell because the owner has no hope that
the neighborhood will return once demolition begins or does not have the money to contest
eminent domain in court. Such an owner may sell the property even though the sales price
does not meet the seller's full valuation of the property. Although some sellers undoubtedly
take this approach to the sales of their lands, the number of such sellers is unknown and
treated as negligible for purposes of this paper.
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Kelo-like cases. The property that sits vacant after litigation is the same
property that government officials touted as having the potential to rejuvenate a
community in the economic doldrums once the property was developed. The
sum not only does not equal its parts, but it is the exact opposite of its parts;
efficiency plus efficiency equals inefficiency.
The inverse relationship between efficient individual transfers and post-
assembly uses that benefit the public interest is the product of a land assembly
process that decouples holding title to property and the immediate ability to
exploit the productivity of that property. Efficiency analysis compares the pre-
and post-transfer uses of property to identify which of those uses increases
public wealth. The public, for example, gains a tangential benefit from the
transfer of title to an adverse possessor because the adverse possessor is, in fact,
making a more productive use of the property than the present possessor.
Within the context of eminent domain, a voluntary pre-litigation transfer of title
may be deemed efficient because the assembler voluntarily purchases title for a
price that meets or exceeds the owner's sale price. But at the time of any single
pre-litigation transfer, the ability to acquire title to all lands needed for the
project and put the assembled lands to productive use in the future is
speculative. From the perspective of the public interest, a project's efficiency is
only gauged, and the public benefit can only be obtained, after the property is
put to use in conjunction with the redevelopment plan. The public interest does
not benefit from the naked transfer of title from property owner to land
assembler divorced from the future use of the aggregated property.
The idle properties in New London and Norwood are evidence of the
schism between a title transfer that is efficient in isolation and post-assembly
use that amounts to post-litigation waste. Acquiring title represents a necessary,
but not sufficient, step in a lengthy process that culminates in the successful
completion of a development project. In fact, "[i]t rarely happens that
proceedings for the condemnation of and for public use are instituted without
months, years, and, in some instances, decades of time spent in preliminary
discussion and in the making of tentative plans." 74 As plans and litigation
proceed over extended periods of time, circumstances change and such changes
may adversely impact the prospects for development. The Kelo saga unfolded
over the course of seven years, while Norwood's eminent domain odyssey took
four years to make its way from Norwood's city council to the highest court in
Ohio.75 Those two cases illustrate the risk posed by the passage of time:
changes in the developer's viability (Kelo) or the unwillingness of ready,
willing, and able tenants to wait for the land assembly process to run its course
(Norwood) made the acquisition of title insufficient to advance the projects.76
74 4 NICHOLS, supra note 71, § 12B. 17(1).
75 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508 (Conn. 2004); Norwood v. Homey,
830 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the developer first contacted
Norwood about development in 2002).
76 Katie Nelson, CT Land Taken from Homeowners Still Undeveloped, HARTFORD Bus.
J. ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article.php?RFITEM%5B%
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The risk of post-litigation waste increases as the bifurcated process of land
assembly grinds onward; development plans are title-dependent but not time-
independent.
Ironically, one of the factors contributing to the duration of the land
assembly process is the public interest itself. Although the public interest is not
formally involved in pre-litigation bargaining, it has an unmistakable effect on
pre-litigation negotiations between land assemblers and property owners. The
most commonly identified impact of the public interest on voluntary
negotiations is that it provides an incentive for owners of property in areas
targeted for acquisition to hold out. If the land assembler fails to offer a price
that matches the owner's valuation of the property, the holdout owner can
proceed to trial knowing that the least she will receive for the property is fair
market value, which equates to "just compensation" for constitutional
purposes. 77 On the other hand, a legal win gives holdouts a virtual injunction
against forcible acquisition; therefore, such property owners can hold out for a
price that far exceeds the fair market value of the property. The last Norwood
holdout, for example, purchased his property in 1991 for $63,900 and, after
winning the litigation, sold it to the developer for $1.25 million. 78 As evidence
of the value of holding out longer than one's fellow holdouts, the second to last
victorious Norwood holdouts received $650,000 for title to their property. 79
Within the world of pre-eminent domain litigation bargaining, however, the
impact of the public interest is rather Newtonian. The public interest not only
provides a property owner with an incentive to hold out, but also instructs a
rational land assembler to react with an equal and opposite stratagem to obtain
the lowest price for the property. In many cases, the land assembler has a pre-
arranged deal with the condemning authority that the latter will use eminent
domain to acquire properties that cannot be obtained by voluntary negotiation.80
If a deal cannot be struck, the land assembler may externalize the cost of
5D=Article$0@10395;Article (The executive director of the New London Development
Corporation commented that "[i]f there had been no litigation, which took years to work its
way through (the court system), then a substantial portion of this project would be
constructed by now... [b]ut we are victims of the economic cycle, and there is nothing we
can do about that.").
77United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("The Court
therefore has employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condemnee's
loss."); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950) (stating that
"[f]air market value has normally been accepted as a just standard" for compensation);
LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 21, at 96-99 (James C.
Bonbright ed., 2d ed. 1953) (observing that value is determined "at the time of the taking").
Defining "fair market value" as the "value at the time of the taking" presents an
interpretative problem because pre-litigation voluntary transfers are, by definition, not
takings; therefore, demolition could, in theory, affect "value at the time of taking." Id. § 21,
at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted).78 Kemme, supra note 23.
791d.
8 Norwood, 830 N.E.2d at 384-85.
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acquisition to the public by forcing the condemning authority to acquire title in
court. For example, the official bargaining on behalf of the National Park
Service in Althaus v. United States announced that
I am in charge of acquiring lands for the National Park Service. Even though
we know what your lands are worth, we are going to try and get them for 30
cents on every dollar that we feel they are worth. Of course, you don't have to
accept this 30 cents on the dollar. We will let you wait for a couple of years. If
you don't take 30 cents on the dollar right now, you wait for a couple of years.
After a couple of years if you won't take 30 cents on the dollar, we are going to
condemn it. We will condemn your property. You know what that is going to
mean? That means that you are going to have to hire an expensive lawyer from
the city and he is going to take one-third of what you get. Plus, you know who
is going to have to pay the court costs. You are. That is in addition to these
expensive lawyers. 81
Thus, the public interest that looms in the shadow of pre-litigation
negotiations simultaneously reduces a land assembler's incentive to bargain and
diminishes the land assembler's risk of loss if voluntary bargains cannot be
reached. The impact of the public interest on pre-litigation private negotiations
is to provide a land assembler with an incentive to hold out just like the property
owners on the other side of the bargaining table.
Using the public interest as a backstop during pre-litigation negotiations is
not the only strategy employed by land assemblers designed to pry title from
property owners on favorable terms. Once title to a property is acquired, the
land assembler often razes the structures located on the property after
acquisition but prior to obtaining title to all of the land for the project. In both
Kelo and Norwood, for example, most of the property owners in the areas
targeted for redevelopment voluntarily agreed to sell their properties to the
assembler before litigation.82 Prior to assembling all of the parcels necessary for
development, the land assembler bulldozed the structures on those properties. 83
Notably, the "acquire and destroy" pattern of land assembly is not limited to the
circumstances in either New London or Norwood. Rather, it appears to be an
integral part of the land assembler's standard playbook. The "hole" grows in
81 Althaus v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 688, 691-92 (1985). But see Hubenak v. San
Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 176 (Tex. 2004) (containing data showing
that the pre-condemnation offers exceeded actual condemnation awards in that case).82 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005); Norwood, 830 N.E.2d at
385.
83 JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HouSE 238-39, 374 (2009) (noting that the condemning
authority had begun to clear structures from the acquired lands four years prior to its
ultimate settlement with Kelo); Kemme, supra note 23.
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Brooklyn because the Atlantic Yards developer began demolition prior to the
acquisition of title to all of the parcels necessary for the project.84
As a bargaining tactic, the impact of a land assembler's quick demolition of
structures on acquired properties is subjective-remaining owners have an
increased incentive to sell because the incentives to remain decrease as
structures within the targeted area are destroyed. Commenting on the effect of
unoccupied properties created during 1960s urban renewal, the Housing and
Finance Agency's general counsel observed that "the percentage of empty
houses becomes more than the remaining residents can bear, and they are forced
out, regardless of the burden placed upon them of such premature moving." 85 If
the incentive to move linked to empty buildings is great, the incentive should be
equally great once the lots are cleared and rubble mounts. Indeed, Susette Kelo
expressed reticence about remaining in Fort Trumbull if she won her case after
all of the properties had been bulldozed and her neighbors had moved.86
Although it unquestionably benefits assemblers in the short term, the
"acquire and destroy" strategy used during the private phase of land assembly
imperils the long-term public interest. Because most properties in targeted areas
are acquired by voluntary agreement, 87 "acquire and destroy" permits a land
assembler to demolish structures on a majority of properties before securing
title to all necessary properties or knowing that such title will ever be acquired.
Successful completion of a project, however, is not solely dependent upon title
aggregation. The Kelo plaintiffs lost while the Norwood plaintiffs were
victorious, and the assembler in each case eventually obtained title to all
necessary plots of land.88 Nevertheless, both projects stalled and the promised
kinetic energy to be generated from the project remains untapped. Destroying
structures on acquired properties without having title to all parcels is a means to
an end that is alleged to promote the public interest, but that end may never be
achieved, leaving the public to pay the costs of the means.
The invisible costs to which the public has been exposed because of the
duration of the land assembly process and pre-assembly destruction crystallize
if development fails to materialize after title issues are resolved. Property taxes
on acquired properties may decline after demolition to reflect the absence of
84 Atlantic Yards, Inch by Inch, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 29, 2009),
http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/topic/55684/ (describing three major lawsuits and
"roughly ten minor legal skirmishes" associated with the project).85 Lyman Brownfield, The Disposition Problem in Urban Renewal, 25 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 732, 738 (1960).86 BENEDICT, supra note 83, at 363 (One of the reasons Kelo decided to leave the
property was that "she got a sense of what it would feel like if she prevailed and got to stay
in the fort-awfully lonely .... The thought of staying behind in an abandoned
neighborhood without her friends felt terribly depressing.").
877 NICHOLS, supra note 71, § G6.01[9][a] ("The vast majority of private property
needed for public use is acquired without the necessity of condemnation.").88 See Kemme, supra note 23; George Lefcoe, Jeff Benedict's Little Pink House: The
Back Story of the Kelo Case, 42 CONN. L. REv. 925, 953-55 (2010) (book review).
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structures on the property.89 Moreover, owners of neighboring properties
untouched by the redevelopment plan must confront the risk that their property
values will decrease due to problems that often accompany vacant properties.90
And if neighboring owners believe that their properties might be in the
crosshairs of compulsory acquisition in the future, they have a reduced
incentive to maintain their properties, a phenomenon termed "condemnation
blight."91 In addition to the loss suffered by individual property owners, a
community stands to lose millions of dollars after property acquired for
redevelopment devolves into a large field of weeds. New London, for example,
sunk a substantial amount of money into its redevelopment project in the form
of new infrastructure to accommodate large-scale development and tax
incentives to bring Pfizer to town.92 If the development project is abandoned,
such investments are wasted unless another developer takes over the project
with identical infrastructure needs, which, in New London's case, has not yet
happened.
The absence of post-litigation development not only externalizes an
objective financial cost to the public, but also imposes a subjective cost on the
public. Post-litigation desolation erects a subjective impediment to future
development of the site. According to one account of the post-Kelo prospects
for the Fort Trumbull neighborhood in New London, future developers are not
expected to rush to develop the site because of its turbulent history. 93 The field
of weeds is a symbol of compulsory acquisition of private property that
89 See David Collins, Think Small at Fort Trumbull, THE DAY (New London), Nov. 25,
2009, at B1 (discussing a proposal that would "be a short route to putting the property [Fort
Trumbull] back on the tax rolls").
90 Gamett, supra note 31, at 955 (listing such problems as "crime, vandalism, fire
hazards, and worry about unsafe and unsanitary conditions"). But see John Brooks &
William Busch, Perception v. Reality: A Commentary on Media Bias and Eminent Domain,
RIGHT OF WAY INT'L Ass'N, 23 (May/June 2008), https://www.irwaonline.org/
EWEB/upload/0508a.pdf (noting that New London's tax revenue did not diminish much as a
result of redevelopment).
914 NICHOLS, supra note 71, § 12B.17(6).
92 Collins, supra note 89 (describing difficulties associated with pursuing a different
project in light of the addition of streets and utilities to benefit large development at the site);
Ted Mann, Bringing Pfizer to New London Came at a Heavy Cost to Taxpayers, THE DAY
(New London), Nov. 21, 2009, at Al.
93 Brooks & Busch, supra note 90, at 23 ("The cost of the negative media attention to
Kelo may still be affecting the City of New London to this day. While projects and site plan
approvals are in place for about half of the development parcels, there are still parcels
available, and funding is tight for the remaining public investment required to complete the
project. There is no question that the delays due to litigation have been costly in terms of
financial exposure and loss of momentum. We believe that some of this can be attributed to
the media attention given the case. There are many theories regarding the usefulness of name
recognition, regardless of the source. In this case the name recognition has definitely come at
a cost, since the media coverage was primarily very negative, and we have really been
unable to 'manage' it in any sense."). Furthermore, the authors anticipate a bright future for
New London "once the Kelo stigma has been shaken." Id. at 25.
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forestalls post-litigation development efforts. Notably, stigmatization of real
property is not unknown to property law. Statutory law in several states
recognizes subjective stigma associated with psychologically impaired property
for purposes of real estate disclosures.94 The stigmatization of the property in
Kelo differs from the stigma comprehended by real estate statutes, but the
property is nonetheless stigmatized, and the absence of meaningful post-
assembly proposals is a testament to the deleterious impact of that subjective
stigma. In fact, in early 2010, a developer made a formal proposal for
developing the New London site, but has yet to break ground on the project. 95
III. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF LAND ASSEMBLY
Unlike the attack on Kelo launched by most post-Kelo scholarship, two
recent scholarly proposals argue that the holdout problem can be averted by
implementing a process of land assembly that differs from the traditional
bifurcated model. The corollary to these proposals is that altering the process of
land assembly obviates the need for eminent domain in Kelo-like settings. As a
result, those two proposals--creating land assembly districts and secret
purchases of land-have a direct bearing on the problem of post-litigation waste
accompanying the traditional two-stage process of land assembly. While each
provides valuable insight, neither comprehensively addresses the risk of post-
litigation waste associated with land assembly; therefore, the real-world
outcomes in New London and Norwood remain a possibility under either
proposal.
A. Land Assembly Districts
A land assembly district (LAD) utilizes intra-neighborhood negotiations as
a mechanism to transfer land to a developer without eminent domain. To form
an LAD, an interested party presents government officials with a plan that
includes a description of the area targeted and the future use of the land once
assembled. 96 If approved, government officials organize meetings at which
affected property owners learn about LADs and listen to presentations from
potential purchasers of the neighborhood as well as opponents of potential
sales.97 Once the LAD receives an offer, the neighborhood debates the merits of
94 IND. CODE § 32-21-6-3 (2010) (defining "psychologically affected property"); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 114 (2010) (recognizing "psychologically impacted property"); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 442.600 (2000) (defining "psychologically impacted real property"); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-20.8-6 (2009) (governing "[djisclosure of psychologically impacted property").95 Kathleen Edgecomb & Stephen Chupaska, NLDC to Explore Developer's Plan for
Village Theme at Fort Trumbull, THE DAY (New London), Feb. 20, 2010, at A1.96 Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1465,
1488-89 (2008) (noting that the "LAD promoter" could be just about anyone who thinks an
area may be ripe for economic development).97 1d. at 1490-91.
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the offer and a formal vote on the proposed sale is taken. 98 Voting rights among
affected property owners are apportioned according to the percentage of
property owned within the area designated for sale.99 If the sale is approved by
a majority of voting property owners, the entire neighborhood is transferred to
the winning bidder.100 If, on the other hand, the proposition fails to gain
majority approval from the affected voters, the properties remain titled in their
present owners and "all possibility of assembly by any means other than
voluntary private assembly would be at an end." 10'
The LAD approach to land assembly differs from the typical land assembly
process in three distinct ways. First, an LAD involves a one-step process as
opposed to the two-step process associated with most redevelopment projects-
property owners collectively participate in a "one-shot deal" based upon a tally
of the individual votes.102 For an individual voter, an affirmative vote means
that the owner's share of the proceeds is greater than or equal to the owner's full
valuation of the property to be sold. On the other hand, if the offered price falls
below that amount, an owner is likely to vote against the sale of the
neighborhood. If a sufficient number of voters are like-minded, the sale will not
be approved and the owners will retain their properties. 0 3 Thereafter, the
assembler will have to assemble the properties on a piecemeal basis if the
project is to move forward. Second, the public interest is introduced at the
beginning of the LAD process via LAD certification as opposed to at the end of
the bifurcated land assembly process. The public interest cannot be asserted at
the end of the LAD mechanism because eminent domain is not an option after a
negative vote on the sale of the neighborhood. 10 4 Finally, the LAD gives owners
within the district "the collective power to force each member of the LAD to
accept a land assembler's proposal to buy the neighborhood;" holdouts cannot
block the sale of the entire neighborhood.10 5
Because some owners are likely to object to the sale of their properties, an
owner may opt-out of the LAD sale and "insist that his or her parcel be
purchased through ordinary eminent domain procedures."' 1 6 This is the
equivalent of a just compensation hearing associated with traditional eminent
domain procedure and ensures that all owners receive no less than the amount
98 Id. at 1491.
991d. at 1503.
10°M. at 1469 (specifying that selling the neighborhood requires majority approval from
stakeholders and that voting rights are apportioned by property ownership within the LAD).
10 1Id. at 1491.
102 Heller & Hills, supra note 96, at 1472.103 Id
1041d. at 1491.




that satisfies constitutional requirements.' 0 7 However, proponents of LADs
expect few holdouts because the LAD may receive bids on the properties from
multiple offerors, which increases competition for the properties.10 8
Competitive bidding is likely to produce larger cash distributions per opt-in
owner than the opt-out owner is likely to obtain as just compensation in court;
therefore, the likelihood of holdouts shrinks. 109 Owners receiving greater
payouts following the sale of an entire neighborhood are, in essence, capturing a
greater proportion of the assembly value of the parcels of land in the
neighborhood."10
The ability of an owner to opt out of the LAD, however, is likely to
transform the one-shot deal into a two-shot deal, thereby mirroring the two-step
land assembly process of statutorily required private negotiation and litigation.
While multiple buyers might compete to acquire the land, thereby driving up the
price of the assembled lands, history suggests that multiple buyers will not
readily participate in a competitive bidding process. "' Examples of government
acquisition of property for redevelopment and subsequent failure to secure a
developer are legion. A study conducted during the heyday of urban renewal,
for example, concluded that governments spent an average of three years
attempting to sell the land they had acquired for purposes of redevelopment.12
Following the same pattern, the developer in Kelo abandoned the project in
2008, and developers have not scrambled to acquire the now-vacant properties
at issue in the case. 113 While the Kelo properties are tainted by the national
controversy, the historical number of failed projects involving a post-land
assembly lack of developer interest indicates that New London's plight is not
extraordinary. If competition for LAD properties fails to materialize, the
amount of money to be distributed upon sale is not much of a barrier against
opting out.
Even if multiple bids are made for LAD properties, history again suggests
that increased money is an insufficient inducement to prevent some property
owners from fighting to retain their properties. General Motors offered above-
107Id. at 1470 (stating that "owners within a LAD... have the right to opt out and
receive the full, existing measure of constitutional protection (that is, condemnation based on
fair market value)").
108 Heller & Hills, supra note 96, at 1496-97.
10 9 Id.
I lOld. at 1468-69. For other examples involving the capture of assembly value, see
Michelle Crouch, A Neighborhood in North Carolina Is Put Up for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2005, § 11, at 8 (detailing several examples involving the sale of an entire
neighborhood).
I11 This is not intended to suggest that such competition has not occurred in the past or
would never occur in the future. Examples of such bidding exist. See, e.g., Crouch, supra
note 110 (describing several examples involving the sale of an entire neighborhood).
''2David B. Carlson, The Unrealized Profits in Urban Renewal, ARCHITECTURAL
FORUM, July 1962, at 101.
113 Kathleen Edgecomb, Yale Group Looking Long-Term at Fort Trumbull, THE DAY
(New London), Apr. 21, 2010, at Bi.
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market incentives to residents of a neighborhood in Michigan so that it could
build an assembly plant on their properties after acquisition. 114 Nonetheless, a
number of the residents held out and a protracted legal battle resulted in
Michigan's maligned decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit.115 Similarly, the developer in Norwood offered to pay each owner 35%
above fair market value for their properties, but five owners held out.116 Offers
above fair market value merely serve to supplement financial assistance
available under current law to property owners losing title to property by
eminent domain) 17 In fact, property owners commonly receive more than fair
market value for the properties taken by eminent domain because of statutorily
required payments. 118 Notwithstanding attractive financial incentives, the
number of projects that have been completed without holdouts is microscopic
compared to those that confront holdouts.
In addition to the monetary incentive to opt-in produced by competitive
bidding for the neighborhood, informal pressure from neighbors could dissuade
fellow neighbors from opting out, particularly if property owners receive offers
above fair market value for their properties. Neighbors in favor of selling the
neighborhood are, after all, in a prime position to exert pressure on other
neighbors to accept the deal.1 19 But pressure from neighbors fails to influence
holdouts if money does not serve as the basis of the holdout. The voluntary
sales contracts in Norwood included financial bonuses that were originally
conditioned on the acquisition of all of the parcels for the project, 120 increasing
the tension between would-be payout recipients and holdouts. One neighbor
commented that "[i]f this had happened twenty-five years ago, somebody would
have been found at the bottom of the Ohio River." 121 Despite an alleged
agreement not to harass the holdouts, angry owners who wanted their payouts
114 James Kelly, The Last Days of Poletown, TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at 29.
1 15 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981),
overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). For criticism of
the Poletown decision, see, for example, Jenny Nolan, Auto Plant vs. Neighborhood: The
Poletown Battle, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 27, 2000), http://apps.detnews.com/apps/history/
index.php?id=18.
1 16 Gary Greenberg, The Condemned, MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 42, 44-45,
available at http://motherjones.com/politics/2005/01/condemned?page = 1.
117 Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 121 (2006); see also Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 §210, 42 U.S.C. § 4630 (2006).
118 Gamett, supra note 117, at 121. This, of course, might also provide an incentive to
hold out because the financial package available after a court-ordered taking might exceed
the financial package offered by the assembler.
119 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 854 (3d ed. 2005).
120 John Gibeaut, Taking Control: The Eminent Domain Controversy Finds a Battlefront
in the Development of a Cincinnati Suburb, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2005, at 45, 50. Before an
appellate court handed down its decision regarding the result at trial, the developer began




posted signs deriding the holdouts. 122 Nevertheless, the Norwood holdouts
withstood the pressures and pressed the case to the highest court in Ohio--and
won. Holding out under informal pressure demonstrates that the above market
offer to purchase did not account for the subjective value the holdouts placed on
the property. 123
Similar to the swirl of litigation that accompanies most holdouts subject to
eminent domain, opting out of the LAD is likely to breed litigation. Because
LADs do not utilize eminent domain, opt-outs cannot challenge the loss of their
properties on public use grounds. Nevertheless, opting-out owners who want to
fight the loss of property will not fail to find a legal challenge to reverse an
affirmative vote to sell the neighborhood. In fact, property owners challenging a
taking often raise legal claims outside of the constitutional public use context.
Poletown residents, for example, attacked the acquisition of their properties on
the ground that it violated the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. 124 While
the Poletown holdouts did not win their environmental claim, 125 the assertion
forced the City to defend the claim, drained resources, and consumed time for
all of the parties involved in the process. Given the certification, debate, and
voting procedures required to implement an LAD sale, opt-out owners should
have fertile ground upon which to file a claim. Dissatisfied owners, for
example, may challenge the government's certification of the LAD on due
process grounds or claim that the allocation of voting rights violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 126
The ongoing battle over Brooklyn's Atlantic Yards project provides a vivid
display of the variety of legal challenges that may be deployed to arrest
redevelopment projects in the short term. Local residents have filed no less than
thirteen lawsuits against the condemnor in an effort to halt the project. 127 In
addition to a public use claim under state law, challengers have alleged
122 Greenberg, supra note 116, at 47 ("[Y]ellow signs bearing messages like 'HELD
HOSTAGE' and 'WE SUPPORT ROOKWOOD EXCHANGE' sprout[ed] like dandelions
from front lawns, and a king-size bedsheet banner hanging from Sandy Dittoe's pink stucco
one-story declar[ed], '64 OF 65 RESIDENTS WANT OUT. I AM ONE OF THEM."').
123 Gibeaut, supra note 120, at 46 (asserting that one of the Norwood holdouts
commented that the home was "our castle" and "[w]e didn't have to share anything with
anybody"); Greenberg, supra note 116, at 44 (reporting that one of the Norwood holdouts
stated that "[wje started here, we raised two kids here, we finish up here").
124 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Mich.
1981).
12 5 1d.
126This Article will not address the merits of these claims, but only offers them as
examples of arguments that might be made against a LAD that differ from those that are
typically made in the context of eminent domain. For an analysis of an equal protection
claim, see Heller & Hills, supra note 96, at 1503-07.
127 Atlantic Yards, Inch by Inch, supra note 84 (describing three major lawsuits and
"roughly ten minor legal skirmishes" associated with the project).
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violations of environmental laws, 128 infringement of the attorney-client
privilege, 129 and questioned the legality of the project's planning in court
filings. 130 Recently, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the exercise of
eminent domain against the public use challenge. 131 Despite the adverse public
use ruling, several groups have considered filing yet another Atlantic Yards
lawsuit alleging improprieties in the sale of bonds to fund the project. 132 If the
Atlantic Yards complainants can allege such a broad array of non-public use
claims, dissatisfied LAD owners should find no shortage of legal claims to press
as well.
The outcome of the litigation may impact the viability of the LAD project
in the future, but the immediate effect of opt-out litigation is to increase the time
between title transfers and productive use of the aggregated properties, thereby
endangering the long-term prospects of the project. Many states permit
"redevelopment projects to begin even before the validity of the condemnation
has been adjudicated or compensation awarded. '133 Because demolition may
begin before completing the LAD process of land assembly, the possibility of
post-litigation waste emerges as opt-out owners file legal challenges while the
structures on neighboring properties are leveled. Litigation consumes time, and
circumstances may change as time passes. If any of the substantive legal claims
is a winner or the feasibility of development changes from its initial conditions,
the homes and businesses belonging to opt-outs could be the only structures
standing in the area. Under those circumstances, the appearance of the LAD
will mirror that of New London and Norwood, and the costs of the sale and
demolition of the properties will again be borne by the public. 134
128 Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., No. 0104597/2007, 2008
WL 206942, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2008).
129 Develop Don't Destroy Brooklyn v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 816 N.Y.S.2d 424,
430 (App. Div. 2006).130 Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Empire State Dev. Corp., No. 114631/2009,
2010 WL 936220, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2010).
131 Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 170-73 (N.Y. 2009).
Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals relied on Goldstein to uphold an exercise of
eminent domain to eradicate blight in Kaur v. N.Y State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721,
730-33 (N.Y. 2010). The land sought to be acquired in Kaur is slated to be transferred to
Columbia University for purposes of campus extension. Id. at 724.
132 Norman Oder, Hail Mary or Silver Bullet: Perkins, Raising Questions of Fraud in
Arena Bond Sale, Asks to Put Atlantic Yards on Hold, ATLANTIC YARDS REP. (Dec. 19, 2009
5:12 PM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/12/hail-mary-or-silver-bullet-
perkins.html. The Goldstein decision was issued on November 24, 2009; therefore, the
potential legal action described in the blog post must be filed, if ever, after losing the public
use issue.
133 Heller & Hills, supra note 96, at 1496-97.
134 For another critique of LADs, see Daniel B. Kelly, The Limitations of Majoritarian




B. Secret Purchases of Property
Compared to the complexity of a LAD with its certification, voting, and
opt-out provisions, the assembly of land using secret purchases is relatively
straightforward. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit described secret purchases of land as a
"common arms-length business practice."'135 On the surface, assembling land
via secret purchase involves nothing more than a series of individual land
transactions between a buyer and seller where the buyer intends to use the land
for a different purpose after purchase. The difference, however, is that the
"buyer" is not offering to purchase the property for the buyer's own purposes.
Instead, the "buyer" is an agent for an undisclosed principal. In many cases, the
party negotiating with the property owner knows neither the true identity of the
principal nor the project for which the property is being assembled. 136 Because
neither "buyers" nor sellers have full information about the principal or future
usage of the assembled lands, secret land assembly is a "double-blind
acquisition system."1 37
Apart from the secrecy shrouding the principal, secret purchases of property
for assembly purposes differ from the typical bifurcated process in one basic
way-negotiations do not occur in the shadow of eminent domain. Without the
background of eminent domain, the incentive to bargain strategically decreases
because a seller neither knows the identity of the principal nor the purpose of
the purchase. 138 Either a secret buyer's offer meets the property owner's full
valuation of the property, or the present owner retains title to the property. 139
Consequently, secret purchases avoid the risk of holdouts that justifies the
imposition of eminent domain as the last phase of the prototypical land
assembly process. For an undisclosed principal, a secret assembly saves money
that would be spent to induce strategic holdouts to transfer title under the
traditional two-step method of land assembly. Similarly, a secret purchase has a
cost-saving function for a condemning authority-full assembly of necessary
parcels obviates the need for eminent domain. 140
Despite the Sixth Circuit's characterization of secret purchases as a
"common" practice, voluntary sales of entire neighborhoods are, to say the
least, rare. If the approach held such promise, one might expect that developers
would have seized upon it before Kelo. This does not mean that an attempt to
135 Westgate Vill. Shopping Ctr. v. Lion Dry Goods Co., No. 93-3760, 1994 WL
108959, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 1994).
136Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A





140 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 n.24 (2005) (recognizing that
developers could engage in "secret negotiations" for the purchase of land for development,
thereby eliminating the need for eminent domain).
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purchase a large number of closely situated properties in secrecy is doomed to
failure. To the contrary, some attempts at secret purchases have been
successful. 141 However, the paucity of successful examples demonstrates the
limited utility of the approach as a substitute for the traditional bifurcated
process of eminent domain land assembly. Even among the small sample size of
successful secret assemblies, one of the commonly cited "successes" required
eminent domain to secure title to a few properties after acquiring title to most of
the parcels in secret. 142 Reviewing the limited number of successful secret
assemblies suggests that, in most cases, the success of the secret assembly relied
on fortune as much as design. 143
One of the primary impediments to secret assemblies of land is that the
advantage of secrecy lasts only so long as the principal's identity, in fact,
remains secret. If the secret is discovered, the land assembly process transforms
into a mirror image of the bifurcated process of land assembly. To assemble the
land required for "Disney's America" in Virginia, for example, Disney
established a network of dummy corporations and engaged "buyers" (lawyers)
in different states to handle the transactions. 144 Disney also created a paper
intermediary through which all monetary transactions were funneled and took
steps to prevent "buyers" from discovering one another's identities, even if they
worked at the same firm. 145 If those measures were not enough, Disney
channeled all mail 'concerning the transactions through one office that
"meticulously switched" envelopes, and telephone calls were made using a
"special 800 number that could not be traced."' 146 Despite these efforts, The
Washington Post went public with Disney's identity, which had the effect of
141 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities
and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75 (2004) (detailing the voluntary
transaction between the property owners in Cheshire, Ohio, and American Electric Power
Company by which the latter bought the entire town of Cheshire); Crouch, supra note 110
(describing several examples involving the sale of an entire neighborhood). But see Heller &
Hills, supra note 96, at 1473 (noting the rarity of successful secret purchases of land).
142 Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist, President, Congress for New Urbanism in
Support of Petitioners at 7 n.7, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
143 For example, the Norquist amicus brief cites successful examples in locales such as
Las Vegas and Providence, Rhode Island. However, the Las Vegas project took five years to
assemble the land. Id. at 5-6. Similarly, the property for Providence's successful
development was amassed over the course of fifteen years. Brief of Amici Curiae
Connecticut Conference of Municipalities & the State Municipal Leagues of Alabama et al.
in Support of Respondents at 14, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108). Given the lengthy
process associated with each of these successes, the developers seem lucky to have
maintained secrecy for the duration of the process.
144 Tim O'Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse, LEGAL TIMES, June 10, 1994,
at 2.
145 Id. at 21 (If the attorney-appointed president "was ever asked about his sudden
interest in the meat business, he [would] say[] he was told not to lie, but to admit to the




transforming remaining property owners into holdouts. 147 At that point,
Disney's choices were identical to those facing land assemblers using the
bifurcated process: continue negotiations, forego acquisition of holdout
properties or the project in its entirety, or ask local government to use eminent
domain. Disney ultimately shelved its plans for "Disney's America" amid
concerns about the park's proximity to the Civil War battlefield at Manassas,
the environmental impact of the park, and the nature of exhibits to be displayed
at the park. 148
Beyond the internal transaction costs associated with maintaining secrecy
until assembly is complete, the strategy works best in contexts where external
transaction costs are low. During a flight over central Florida in 1963, for
example, Walt Disney identified a "wasteland southwest of Orlando where
alligators outnumbered people" for development. 149 By 1965, Disney had
purchased more than 25,000 acres of land "under a strict cloak of secrecy" from
owners who "were glad to sell dirt cheap" because the property could not be
used for agricultural purposes.150 A major part of Disney's successful assembly
derived from the combination of a small number of property owners with the
limited utility of the desired properties. Because the "sludgy terrain was useless
for agriculture" and "far from Florida's beaches,"'151 the objective fair market
value of the properties was not nearly as high as in other parts of the state.
Furthermore, the subjective value of many of the properties was also low
because their owners obtained title to the properties by inheritance and had
never seen the properties. 152 Thus, the transaction costs associated with
Disney's secret purchases were low, which facilitated the sales.
1471d. at 2 (Disney apparently deemed the parcels that escaped its grasp as "not
essential" to the project but just as parcels that would have been "nice to have.").148 Susan Baer, 'Disney America': Fighting Words in the Hills of Northern Virginia,
BALT. SUN, June 19, 1994, at Al; see also Nikita Stewart, $17 Million Camp Pledges Cut
Scout Nirvana in Va., WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006, at Al (noting that Disney sold the site to
the Boy Scouts in 1994 for $1.7 million). For additional information regarding the
arguments against Disney's project, see, for example, Jeff Daniel, From Tragedy to
Spectacle: Recent Exhibits Highlight Merchandising of Disaster, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 16, 2001, at B 1 ("[T]aste and tone become crucial elements in 'how' historical material
gets presented. In fact, they are sometimes controversial. In the early '90s, a firestorm
erupted when the Walt Disney Co. announced plans for a Virginia theme park titled
'Disney's America.' What rankled critics, especially a vocal number of African-Americans,
were plans for a slavery exhibit-including reenactments-in the half-billion dollar project.
Thrill rides. Snow cones. Slave auctions. Even Disney eventually saw the incongruities, and
by 1994 the park was shelved.").
149 Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers to Amass Land Stage for Kingdom,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K2.
1501d.
151 T. D. Allman, The Theme-Parking, Megachurching, Franchising, Exurbing,
McMansioning of America: How Walt Disney Changed Everything, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC,
Mar. 2007, at 96, 99.
152 Andrews, supra note 149 (noting that some owners "had received their land through
inheritances" and "had never seen it").
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Unlike the low objective and subjective value of "wasteland," the context of
Kelo-like takings is likely to involve high transaction costs that preclude secret
acquisition of all parcels necessary for the project. The areas sought for
redevelopment in Kelo and Norwood contained numerous parcels of land with
numerous owners. Property owners are likely to suspect that something unusual
is happening either when they are approached about selling their properties-
even though their properties are not for sale-or as neighbors suddenly move
without placing their properties on the market. 153 If property owners suspect
that land is being assembled for a change in land use, the potential for strategic
bargaining increases. Furthermore, an owner might place a high subjective
value on property in a Kelo-like setting because it is the family home, which
increases the probability of a holdout.154 If the parcels cannot be acquired
through mutual agreement and the undisclosed principal remains committed to
acquisition, the process of secret land assembly transforms into Kelo and
Norwood's two-step process of land assembly.
In economic terms, the cloak-and-dagger measures taken by secret
principals represent transaction costs, and creating transaction costs is
unnecessary if property owners willingly sell their properties to interested
buyers. Secrecy saves costs if owners who willingly part with title in the
absence of information about the principal would have held out for more money
if the principal's identity had been known. The problem for secret buyers and
their principals is that they cannot distinguish a priori between owners holding
out for strategic purposes and those that refuse to sell regardless of the amount
of the offer. While some owners will undoubtedly hold out under any
circumstances, the number of complainants in most eminent domain cases
suggests that such holdouts are less common than often claimed. New London's
redevelopment project at issue in Kelo required the acquisition of 115 privately
owned parcels of land and only nine property owners refused to transfer title
voluntarily. 155 The Fort Trumbull holdouts controlled a mere 2% of the ninety
acres sought to be acquired for development. 156 Similarly, the Norwood
153 Mark Seidenfeld, In Search of Robin Hood. Suggested Legislative Responses to
Kelo, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 305, 318 (2008) ("Even if the buyer hides its identity
with respect to each purchase, in order to purchase all the parcels the buyer will eventually
have to take the initiative to approach those who have not put their property on the market.
This will tip off perceptive observers that someone is really interested in parcels in the area,
and eventually will reveal the plans of the buyer, which in turn will encourage holdouts.").
154 Amicus Curiae Brief on the Merits of Mountain States Legal Foundation &
Defenders of Property Rights in Support of Petitioners at 3, Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108) (Wilhelmina Dery, one of the Kelo holdouts, was born in
the house sought to be acquired and had resided there with her husband for fifty years prior
to the taking.). Commercial owners may place a high subjective value on their properties due
to the goodwill that has been generated in that location over time.
15 5 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474-75.
156 BENEDICT, supra note 83, at 15.
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holdouts owned five of the sixty-nine parcels required for development. 157 For
the majority of property owners who own parcels slated for development, the
transaction costs associated with transforming an ordinary land transaction into
a quasi-CIA operation are wasted; the deal would have occurred without
incurring those costs.
Secret purchases of property do more than waste resources to maintain
secrecy of transactions that would occur without secrecy; the duration of many
projects using secret purchases to assemble land also permits a change of
circumstances to affect those projects. Harvard University, for example, secretly
acquired fifty-two acres of property for purposes of expansion using an
undisclosed buying agent who purchased $88 million worth of real estate over
the course of a decade. 158 During the decade-long secret assembly, local
residents had been "living alongside all of Harvard's vacant buildings and
abandoned property for almost 10 years,"'159 which drained the economic and
social life from the area. 160 In late 2009, Harvard announced that it would
postpone development of the secretly acquired parcels because of the effect of
the nation's financial downturn on Harvard's endowment.' 61 Stopping
construction of Harvard's new science complex has left "a giant hole in the
ground."' 162 For now, the end result of secrecy is not dramatically different from
real world consequences in New London and Norwood.
lV. A DIFFERENT STRATEGY TO REDUCE EMINENT DOMAIN WASTE
Whether pursuant to statutory mandate, LAD, or secret purchase, the
sequence of acquisition, demolition, and delay externalizes costs to the public if
the promised development fails to rise from demolition rubble. To counter this
risk to the public interest, this Article proposes that interests in property
acquired prior to the assembly of all parcels of land necessary for development
should be held in a land preservation trust (LPT). Given its sufficiently flexible
nature, a trust is an appropriate vehicle to hold title to the properties because it
can not only reduce externalities spawned by private negotiation, but also
respond to unforeseen changes in the future. As importantly, the LPT promotes
the interests of the public, owners retaining title to property after neighbors
157 Greenberg, supra note 116 (noting that the developer had a "stalemate" to force the
city to seek title after deals could not be reached with five of sixty-nine owners).158 Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases of 52 Acres Worth
$88m in Allston, Bos. GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at Al.
159 Tracy Jan, Harvard Slows Work on Allston Complex, Bos. GLOBE, Feb. 19, 2009, at
Al. Harvard's endowment was projected to decrease by 30%. Id. (A member of the Harvard
Allston Task Force continued by stating that "[y]ou can suck it up and take it when you
think it'll be a couple more years and all the watercolor drawings and pretty pictures will
come true. But now this is what I may be looking at for the rest of my life.").
160 Tracy Jan, Dread Is Rising in Harvard's Hole as Work Slows, Acres of Blight Worry
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voluntarily sell their properties, and land assemblers. Although the LPT cannot
be implemented without increased cost to the land assembler and condemning
authority, the increased cost not only promotes better planning practices, but
also prompts land assemblers to engage in pre-litigation negotiations with
greater urgency to save those costs.
A. A Skeleton of the LPT: Purpose, Parties, and Powers
According to Austin W. Scott, author of one of the most influential treatises
on trusts, a trust can be used for purposes "as unlimited as the imagination of
lawyers."'163 To that end, a brief survey of the types of trusts confirms that trust
law recognizes a broad array of trust purposes. The purposes of private trusts
range from permitting a decedent spouse to defer estate taxes on qualifying
property held in trust until the death of a surviving spouse (the ingeniously titled
QTIP trust) to shielding an individual's assets from creditors using an asset
protection trust (an APT trust).164 Beyond these private purposes, trusts may
have commercial purposes and take the form of a business association, such as
the real estate investment trust (a REIT).165 Although some of the trusts have
attracted concern and criticism, 166 the variegated purposes for which trusts have
been employed demonstrate that lawyers have unquestionably used their
imaginations imaginatively.
The purpose of the LPT is to preserve each of the properties within the area
targeted for development until both title and possession of all parcels necessary
for development are, in fact, acquired by voluntary agreement or eminent
domain. In function, the LPT is similar to preservation trusts that have been
created on both national and state levels to protect historic buildings or
culturally sensitive lands.167 The National Trust for Historic Preservation, for
163 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1, at 2 (4th ed.
1987).
164 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (2006) (QTIP provision); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b)
(Supp. 2009) (self-settled asset protection trust); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (West 2007)
(self-settled asset protection trust).
165See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 8-101(b) (Lexis 2002) (defining a
REIT to be "an unincorporated business trust or association formed under this title in which
property is acquired, held, managed, administered, controlled, invested, or disposed of for
the benefit and profit of any person who may become a shareholder").
166 Self-settled asset protection trusts have been subjected to critical examination. See,
e.g., Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors' Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 287 (2002); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000).
167See, e.g., CAL. PRESERVATION FOUND., http://www.californiapreservation.org/ (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011); FLA. TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, http://www.floridatrust.org/
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011); MARTHA'S VINEYARD PRESERVATION TRUST,
http://www.mvpreservation.org/p.php/preservation/home (last visited Oct. 2, 2011); NEW
HAVEN PRESERVATION TRUST, http://nhpt.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011); PRESERVATION
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example, prevents the destruction or deterioration of properties it holds in
trust. 168 Pursuant to its mission, the National Trust for Historic Preservation
filed a lawsuit to stop Wal-Mart from building on the Civil War's Wilderness
Battlefield and participated in litigation to prevent the opening of roads through
Utah's Grand Staircase, which is home to "hundreds of prehistoric sites. 169
The ultimate beneficiary of a preservation trust is the public; many sites
protected by preservation trusts would be subject to the wrecking ball without
the trusts' protection, which would sever irreplaceable links to history. 170
Although the fundamental objective of the LPT is similar to the mission of
a preservation trust, the LPT is not an exact duplicate of a typical preservation
trust. The ultimate goal of many preservation trusts is to protect properties held
in trust in perpetuity. The LPT, on the other hand, cannot offer permanent
protection for its properties.171 Perpetual protection for LPT properties would
forever freeze them in their present states, which is likely to be inefficient given
that the properties are sought for development. Furthermore, the tax benefits
afforded many preservation trusts cannot apply to LPT properties. The Federal
Rehabilitation Tax Credit discourages demolition of historically important
properties by offering tax incentives to restore a "certified historic structure." 172
Reducing or eliminating the tax liability of the properties held by the LPT,
however, would harm the community by withholding money that could be used
to support community services or projects. The financial straits of the
community serve as the stimuli for redevelopment efforts, and reducing tax
income only exacerbates the community's financial problems.
After establishing the purpose of a trust, the next step in trust creation is to
identify the parties with interests in the trust and place property in the trust.173
After the land assembler and property owner have reached agreement to transfer
title to the property, the land assembler transfers title to the property to the LPT
TRUST OF VT., http://www.ptvermont.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011); TENN. PRESERVATION
TRUST, http://www.tennesseepreservationtrust.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).16 8 NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, http://www.preservationnation.org/
about-us/p.php/preservation/home (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
169 Julia Miller, Spotlight on the National Trust's Legal Defense Fund, FORUM NEWS
(Mar. 2010), http://www.preservationnation.org/forum/library/public-articles/spotlight-on-
the-national.html.
17 0 See, e.g., MARTHA'S VINEYARD PRESERVATION TRUST,
http://www.mvpreservation.org/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (stating that its properties are
"threatened by demolition"). For discussion on a trust with a similar purpose, see, for
example, James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
69 (2010).
171 See Dwight Young, What Is the National Register?, PRESERVATION (May/June
2011), http://www.preservationnation.org/magazine/201 1/may-june/what-is-the-national-
register.html.
17 2 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) (2006).
173 The purpose of this section is to outline the basic framework of the LPT and not to
identify all provisions that might be necessary for its function; thus, the use of the word
"skeleton" in the heading for this portion of the article.
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for the benefit of the assembler. 174 If title to all of the necessary properties
cannot be secured by voluntary agreement, the condemning authority may
exercise its eminent domain power and, if successful, transfer title to the
properties it acquires to the LPT. The assembler not only contributes property to
the LPT, but also manages the properties as a trustee of the LPT. However, the
assembler is not the sole trustee of the LPT-the condemning authority is also
designated as a co-trustee of the LPT. As co-trustees, the land assembler and
condemning authority possess identical legal interests in LPT properties;
therefore, the LPT's legal and equitable interests are not unified in one party to
the trust and the LPT does not terminate by merger. 175
Unlike the absence of an explicit public interest prior to an eminent domain
proceeding under the typical land assembly process, the LPT shifts the public
interest forward to provide the public with a formal role during the private
phase of land assembly. For example, decisions regarding the administration of
the trust must be made by unanimous agreement of the co-trustees when a trust
consists of two co-trustees. 176 As a result, the condemning authority/co-trustee
could withhold consent, thereby prohibiting action by the assembler/co-trustee
that might be detrimental to the LPT. Moreover, the condemning authority/co-
trustee has the authority to enforce the trust against the assembler/co-trustee;
therefore, the condemning authority/co-trustee could file suit against the
assembler/co-trustee if the latter's acts violated the purpose of the LPT.177
Indeed, the financial incentives of the co-trustees compel rational co-trustees to
monitor the actions of other co-trustees and enforce the terms of the trust
because a co-trustee may be held liable for a breach of trust committed by
another co-trustee. 178 Thus, the primary benefit of the LPT's co-trustee
arrangement is that the condemning authority, as a representative of the public
interest, serves as a check on the self-maximizing tactics of land assemblers
during the entirety of the typical land assembly process.
Requiring a land assembler to take title to real property acquired by
voluntary transaction as co-trustee of the LPT with the condemning authority
may appear to interfere with the freedom of the land assembler to contract for
the transfer of title. After all, most purchasers of real property take title in fee
174 The LPT could be self-settled or created by statute.
175 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 69 (2003); see also id. § 32 cmt. b ("A
person who receives both the sole legal title to property and the entire beneficial interest in
that property... takes the property free of trust because of the doctrine of merger."); id. § 3
cmts. c-d (noting that "[t]he settlor may serve as trustee, as may a beneficiary"; also
observing that "[t]he settlor or the trustee, or both, may be beneficiaries"). The sole settlor-
co-trustee-sole beneficiary arrangement may appear to be an unusual arrangement upon first
blush, but it is not foreign to trust law. See ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 163, § 99.4, at
65-66 (discussing trusts involving a sole beneficiary and co-trustees, with citations to cases).
176 The unanimity rule applies here because there are only two co-trustees. If there are
more than two co-trustees, the trust may be administered pursuant to a decision by the
majority of the co-trustees. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(a), 7C U.L.A. (2000).




simple and not in trust. However, property law is replete with restrictions on
interests voluntarily transferred between bargaining parties. During the latter
part of the eighteenth century, states sought to eliminate the fee tail from the
pantheon of possessory estates by construing language in deeds that purported
to transfer a fee tail to grant a fee simple to the grantee. 179 In states where the
fee tail escaped abolition, statutes construe language conveying a fee tail as
conveying more acceptable estates, such as a life estate with a remainder in fee
simple, regardless of the grantor's intent. 180 At present, statutes like the Fair
Housing Act limit the ability of a landlord to discriminate against tenants by
placing provisions in leases that have the effect of singling out certain tenants
for different treatment. 181 Thus, requiring the assembler to take title to property
in advance of eminent domain litigation in trust is not an aberration, but rather
consistent with transactional limitations that have long been imposed in other
areas of property law.
In addition to establishing the purpose and the parties with interests in the
LPT, one of its most important provisions is the language used to identify the
duration of the trust. According to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trustee
has "only such power to terminate the trust ... as is granted by the terms of the
trust. ' 182 To account for the possible length of the bifurcated process of land
assembly, the trust must remain in existence until all of the property necessary
for the project has been acquired either voluntarily by mutual agreement or
involuntarily after eminent domain litigation. To define its duration, the LPT
could contain a phrase such as:
This trust shall terminate upon the agreement of the co-trustees following the
acquisition and occupation of all parcels of land necessary for development
regardless of the mechanism of acquisition. At termination, the beneficiary
shall take sole legal and equitable title to all properties held in trust.
Delimiting the LPT's duration in this manner accounts for the various ways
in which properties might be assembled by pre-litigation negotiation, eminent
domain, or a combination of the two. If all properties are acquired voluntarily
without litigation, the trust holds all of the properties and terminates upon the
acquisition of the last parcel necessary for the project as long as the co-trustees
agree to terminate the LPT. The more likely land assembly process involves
both voluntary transfers and involuntary acquisition of property by eminent
domain. Following successful acquisition by eminent domain, the condemning
authority transfers the properties to the trust and the trust may terminate. If, on
the other hand, a court rejects the eminent domain petition submitted by the
condemning authority, the land assembler or condemning authority could
1792 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 14.07 (Michael A. Wolf ed.,
LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2010).180 1d. § 14.07[2].
181 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3604 (2006).
18 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 (2003).
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bargain with holdout owners to obtain title by mutual consent. If the parties
reach post-litigation agreements to transfer title, the lands secured by such
agreements are added to the LPT to give the LPT title to all of the lands
required for development.
Because holdout property owners possess an injunction against acquisition
after winning a legal challenge against a condemning authority, the possibility
exists that the co-trustees will be unable to reach a post-litigation agreement
with a victorious owner for a transfer of title. The LPT, however, does not
automatically terminate upon failure to acquire all of the necessary parcels for
development following unsuccessful attempts at voluntary acquisition. If post-
litigation efforts prove futile, the assembler/co-trustee could redraft
development plans to account for the holdout property owners. Because local
officials would likely be involved in the planning process, the public interest
receives further protection from violations of the LPT. After modifications have
been made to the redevelopment proposal, the trust may terminate and the
assembler acquires legal and equitable title to all of the property in the LPT.
Rather than redesign the development project, the assembler and
condemning authority may, of course, decide to scrap plans after the litigation
ends for any number of reasons. The cost of redesigning the proposal around
holdout owners might be prohibitively high or the duration of litigation could
drain the development of its financial feasibility. Under those circumstances,
the co-trustees may opt to terminate the trust.1 83 In the alternative, another
developer may wish to acquire the properties. If so, the assembler/co-trustee
may transfer its interest in the LPT to a subsequent party willing to assume the
costs of development. To exit the project, the assembler/co-trustee must not
only transfer the trusteeship to a successor co-trustee, but also assign its
beneficial interest in the LPT to the successor co-trustee as a successor
beneficiary. 184 The new co-trustee subsequently enters into a public-private
partnership with the condemning authority to complete the project.
Whether an original or successor co-trustee, a co-trustee possesses a vast
array of powers to manage the property held in trust. The majority of powers
183 For options at termination, see infra Part IV.B.
1 8 4 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 705, 7C U.L.A. (2000), for example, permits a trustee to resign
the office provided that notice is given to the trust's beneficiaries and a court approves the
successor trustee. The common law, on the other hand, only allows for a change of trustees
after a court approval, while the Restatement of Trusts requires that beneficiaries consent to
the change. Consent of all beneficiaries should be easily acquired; the condemning
authority's interest lies in having the property developed, and it is likely indifferent as to
which developer undertakes the task while the trustee is also a beneficiary. Even if court
approval is required for a successor trustee to transfer administration of the trust, a court is
likely to approve a change because the interests of all of the stakeholders in the trust align
and none are impaired by the change. While the condemning authority might have favorite
developers for one reason or another, such favoritism may play little to no role in the
decision to consent to a change in trustees. The condemning authority is likely the local
government, and it faces the prospect of either consenting to the change or the risk of
wasting the land. This provides an incentive to consent to the change.
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accruing to a trustee are established by default, and the list of default powers is
extensive. For example, the Uniform Trust Code contains twenty-six paragraphs
enumerating the default powers available to manage a trust, such as the power
to mortgage trust property and accept/reject additions of property to the trust. 185
To increase the flexibility with which a trustee may manage the trust, a trustee
has broad discretion in exercising default powers.' 86 Settlors, however, may
curtail the discretion afforded a trustee by modifying the default powers of the
trustee by the express terms of the trust. 187 Because a trustee has an affirmative
duty to follow directives specified in the trust instrument, the trustee risks
liability if the trustee exercises a power expressly barred by the language of the
trust instrument. 188
Among the laundry list of default powers that may be exercised by the
trustee as enumerated in Uniform Trust Code section 816 is one that poses a
substantial threat to the purpose of the LPT-a trustee possesses the power to
"raze existing. . . buildings."' 189 The Uniform Trust Code is not exceptional in
its grant of the power to destroy trust property; many state codes grant trustees
the power to destroy structures on real property held by the trusts they
manage. 190 The LPT's mission, however, is to prevent destruction of the
structures standing on LPT properties at the time of acquisition until the LPT
terminates. Consequently, the power to destroy buildings on trust property must
be suspended while the trust remains in existence. To withhold the power to
destroy the properties held by the LPT from the co-trustees, the LPT could
simply contain a clause specifying that no structures in existence at the time of
acquisition shall be razed until trust termination.
The power to destroy property is not the only default power that could be
wielded by a co-trustee to thwart the purpose of the LPT. A trustee generally
has the power to sell trust property unless withheld by the express terms of the
trust. 191 In theory, the co-trustees could sell a LPT property, the subsequent title
holder could raze structures on the property because the subsequent owner is
not subject to terms of the LPT, and then the property could be sold back to the
LPT. Indeed, nullifying transactional strictures by use of a straw is old sport
within property law. In some states, for example, the use of a straw continues to
be an effective tool to evade the four unities (time, title, interest, and
185 1d. § 816.
186Id. § 815(a).
187 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1105,
1105 (2004) ("The law of trusts consists overwhelmingly of default rules that the settlor who
creates the trust may alter or negate.").
18 8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 72 (2003).
18 9 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(8).
190See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10816(8) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 736.0816(9) (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7817(h) (West 2010); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 91-9-107(h) (West 2010).
191 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(2).
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possession) that are required to create a joint tenancy. 192 To avoid the
possibility of frustrating the purpose of the LPT prior to trust termination by
sale, the trust's language must include a ban on the power of sale unless the
trust is to be terminated or the present co-trustee's interest is conveyed to a
successor co-trustee.
Withholding the powers to destroy and sell acquired properties bridges the
gap of time between the transfer of title and the ability to make a productive use
of property during which a change of circumstances might derail the project. In
essence, the LPT maintains the status quo of the targeted area until all necessary
titles are transferred to the LPT and the co-trustees mutually agree to its
termination. Of course, the protection of the LPT lasts only so long as it
exists- changing circumstances could thwart a project's completion after the
termination of the LPT. Prior to termination, however, the LPT preserves the
physical structures on its properties thereby providing greater protection for the
public interest than offered by the "acquire and destroy" strategy permitted by
the traditional land assembly process.
Applying the foregoing LPT provisions to the pre- and post-litigation
circumstances in Kelo illuminates how the LPT might be used to preserve
properties marked for acquisition. New London's developer acquired title to
most of the properties by mutual consent; therefore, those properties would be
held in trust by the LPT. Unlike the demolition that occurred prior to the
termination of the Kelo litigation, the LPT's ban on demolition would shield the
structures on LPT properties from the wrecking ball while the litigation
progressed. The Court's holding in Kelo awarded title to New London;
therefore, the co-trustees could agree to terminate the LPT to initiate the
construction phase of the redevelopment plan. Under the facts of Kelo,
however, the condemning authority may have refused to terminate the LPT
because of the developer's struggle to secure financing from the outset of the
project. In fact, New London had granted several extensions of the right to
develop to the developer prior to the Kelo litigation and that right to develop
expired after the Court's decision. 193 Upon expiration of the right to develop, a
successor co-trustee could be sought or the LPT could be terminated. By
maintaining the status quo until LPT termination, the LPT yields a result that
would have been superior to the field of weeds now occupying the proposed
redevelopment site in New London.
19 2 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 60, at 325 (the straw is used when one prospective
joint tenant already has an interest in the property and wishes to create a joint tenancy in that
property with another party).
19 3 Katie Nelson, Conn. Land Taken from Homeowners Still Undeveloped, SEATrLE




B. Internalization and Flexibility
In his Courses on Equity, Frederic W. Maitland asserted that "of all the
exploits of Equity the largest and the most important is the invention and
development of the Trust. ' 194 Such high praise derived from the "great
elasticity" of the trust.195 In economic terms, "elasticity" equates to
internalizing the costs of managing property for the benefit of another; elasticity
and internalization represent two sides of the same coin. Unlike the marriage of
legal and equitable interests in a single title holder, a trust separates legal and
equitable title among the parties to the trust. This separation of legal and
equitable title allows the trust to adapt to changing circumstances as compared
to situations where title is unified in one party. A legal life tenant, for example,
is generally barred from selling the property subject to the life estate in fee
simple. 196 Because the market for life estates is not likely to be wide or deep, 197
the limited ability to transfer the property in a declining real estate market
threatens to diminish the value of the future interests in the property. Similarly,
the life beneficiary of a trust cannot sell the trust corpus either because the
beneficiary only has an equitable interest in the corpus. The trustee, however, is
permitted to sell trust property as the holder of legal title to trust property. 198 By
selling in a declining real estate market, the trustee reduces the beneficiary's
potential loss; the costs of changing circumstances have been internalized by the
trust.
The primary mechanism of trust internalization is the imposition of liability
on the trustee for a breach of the duties that accompany the position of trustee.
The duty of loyalty, for example, bars a trustee from obtaining a personal
benefit from the administration of the trust-the trustee must manage the trust
"solely in the interest of the beneficiaries."'199 Economically, a breach of the
duty of loyalty imposes a cost on the beneficiary by diverting a benefit from the
beneficiary to the trustee; the cost of the breach is externalized to the
beneficiary. This cost is internalized because the duty of loyalty saddles the
trustee with personal liability for the loss inflicted upon the beneficiary.200
Similarly, the duty of prudence holds the trustee personally accountable for a
failure to satisfy the prudent investor standard that commands a trustee to
194 F.W. MAITLAND, EQuITY 23 (1929).
195 Id.
19 6 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 60, at 215 (noting that such a sale may be permitted
by the terms of the instrument creating the interest).197 A party can only sell the interest that the party possesses; therefore, a life tenant can
only sell a life estate, which gives the buyer an interest measured by the life of the seller. As
a result, the buyer's interest is a life estate pur autre vie. Id. at 202.
198 Id.
199 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (2007).
2 0 0 ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 163, § 205 (describing the various approaches to
remedy a trustee's breach of duty).
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decrease the risk of loss by investing in assets with varying risk profiles.20 1
Again, the beneficiary suffers no harm as a result of the trustee's failure to
diversify the trust portfolio-the costs of the trustee's decisions have been
internalized by the trustee. This, of course, does not mean that the beneficiary's
interest is immunized against harm under all circumstances or that a trustee acts
only out of fear of liability,202 but threatened internalization promotes trustee
compliance with the duties that accompany the position of trustee.
The trustee duty that best promotes the purpose of the LPT is the duty to
protect trust property. This duty requires a trustee to guard trust property against
loss or damage, make necessary repairs to trust property, and obtain insurance
against losses attributable to fire and theft.20 3 Even though the LPT bans
demolition, the co-trustees might be tempted to let the properties fall into
disrepair as a cost-saving measure, thereby imposing a cost upon the public,
particularly neighboring property owners. Indeed, dilapidation is often a
characteristic of blight that justifies acquisition by eminent domain.20 4
Furthermore, letting trust properties fall into disrepair signals remaining
property owners to sell with almost as much strength as demolition of the
structures on acquired properties.20 5 The duty to protect trust property, however,
prevents the co-trustees from permitting LPT properties to decay to the
detriment of the public; the threat of permissive waste is internalized by the
trust.
In combination, restricting the power of the trustee to destroy structures on
acquired properties and the duty to protect trust property benefits the public,
owners who have yet to sell their properties, and land assemblers. The LPT's
ban on destruction until trust termination protects the public interest by reducing
the objective externalities associated with post-acquisition destruction over both
the short and long term. From a financial perspective, the duty to protect
maintains the property tax liability of the acquired properties. Property taxes, of
course, are tied to the fair market value of property, and destroying the
structures on property in Kelo-like settings reduces its fair market value. As a
result, an assembler has an incentive to raze buildings on the property to lower
its tax liability. The developer in Norwood adopted this strategy-destroying
homes on acquired properties and then asking tax authorities to reassess the
201 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77.
202 The internalization effect is only relevant to situations involving a breach of duty by
the trustee. Moreover, this is not intended to suggest that financial incentives are the only
incentives that prompt a trustee to comply with the duties imposed upon trustees. For
example, a given trustee may feel a moral obligation to comply with trustee duties.
203 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRuSTS § 76 cmt. 2(d).
2 04 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c)(1) (Lexis 2007) (identifying blighted property as
property that contains "[t]he presence of structures, buildings, or improvements, which,
because of dilapidation, deterioration, or unsanitary or unsafe conditions, vacancy or
abandonment, neglect or lack of maintenance, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air,
sanitation, vermin infestation, or lack of necessary facilities and equipment, are unfit for
human habitation or occupancy").
205 Brownfield, supra note 85, at 738.
[Vol. 72:4
KELO-STYLE FAILINGS
land as empty lots, which would lower the property taxes to be paid on the
properties. 206 Under these circumstances, the assembler again seeks an
advantage to the detriment of the public-reducing tax revenue is not in the
public's interest in communities experiencing economic distress. The LPT's
preservation of the physical structures curtails the ability of land assemblers to
game the property tax system or permit the properties to deteriorate, which
ultimately accrues to the benefit of the public.
Preserving the trust property not only protects the public's wallet, but also
benefits the owners who have yet to sell their properties to the assembler. As an
initial matter, the market values of neighboring properties are likely to stabilize
because the LPT neutralizes the risk of harms associated with vacant lots.207
Furthermore, the ban on destroying the structures on LPT properties prevents
demolition from being used as a leverage to persuade property owners to sell.
The impact of the bargaining chip of destruction is blunted; holdout owners are
free to bargain without the impact of the negative externality of neighborhood
demolition. In economic terms, the terms of the LPT provide remaining owners
with a positive externality.
In addition to the LPT's positive effects on the interests of both the public
and the owners of property yet to be acquired by the assembler/co-trustee, the
LPT also has the potential to benefit its co-trustees if the project is abandoned in
the future. The present "acquire and destroy" strategy narrows the future market
for the properties because the pre-destruction use is largely foreclosed by
destruction. Post-demolition use as a single-family home is not completely
foreclosed because single-family homes can be built on empty lots, but such a
project would require an injection of capital from a developer. As Kelo and
Norwood show, subsequent developers who want to take on development
projects after prior developers fail are not readily available. Preserving the
structures on the acquired properties, on the other hand, broadens the sales
market if the co-trustees choose to terminate the LPT by putting its properties
up for sale. Residential buyers may purchase the homes upon trust termination
while developers can purchase the property as well with demolition being the
only added cost. 208 Maintaining the structures on the acquired properties
thickens what would otherwise be a thinner sales market.
Despite the expansion of the sales market, the LPT has a downside for the
land assembler and condemning authority as co-trustees of the LPT. Simply
stated, the LPT is likely to increase the cost of land assembly for both the
assembler and condemning authority. The combination of the LPT's ban on
demolition and the trustee's duty to protect trust property means that the co-
trustees will have to finance internal and external maintenance costs for trust
206 Gregory Korte, Norwood Center Argues for Lower Taxes, CIN. ENQUIRER, Apr. 3,
2006, at 1 B (stating that the request would save the developer $200,000 in property taxes).
207 Garnett, supra note 3 1, at 955.
208 The subsequent developer would become a co-trustee of the LPT and seek to
terminate the trust.
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properties. The cost of maintenance is added to the cost of acquiring title by
eminent domain for the condemning authority while that same cost is added to
expenditures required to secure title by private agreement for the land
assembler. As a result, a possibility exists that the land assembler and
condemning authority will collude to lower the financial cost of LPT
management. The co-trustees could, for example, cut a secret deal that neither
co-trustee will enforce the duty to protect trust property, thereby permitting LPT
properties to deteriorate. If neither co-trustee enforces the express terms of the
LPT, the LPT's internalization effect vanishes.
The structure of the LPT, however, counteracts the incentive to subvert the
purpose of the trust via collusive agreement by linking the financial fortunes of
condemning authorities and land assemblers. The present bifurcated land
assembly process disproportionately allocates the risk of loss to the public
because a land assembler maximizes short-term interests by destroying
structures on acquired properties and may ultimately exit the project. After the
developer abandons the project, the public continues to bear the long-term costs
of failed developmental efforts in the form of stigmatized, vacant lands and the
loss of revenue that follows former residents to new locales. The LPT, however,
conjoins the time horizons of condemning authorities and land assemblers by
connecting each to the project until the LPT terminates. Neither the condemning
authority nor the land assembler may be relieved of the legal duty to maintain
the trust in the short term, and both parties suffer the consequences of
permissive waste in the long term. Presumably, the co-trustees will not want to
sell the properties at a loss upon LPT termination or expend money to repair
properties to make them saleable. As a result, the mutual investment interests of
the parties in the project counsels co-trustees to comply with their duties and the
terms of the trust to reduce the risk of loss if the plan for redevelopment
disintegrates due to a change in circumstances.20 9
The co-trustees not only have an investment-backed incentive to comply
with the terms of the trust and their duties, but may also take measures to offset
the costs of compliance. Absent an express prohibition by the terms of the trust,
trustees generally have the power to lease property held in trust.210 Rental
payments from tenants of properties held by the LPT may be used to defray the
209 The structure of the LPT cannot eliminate the risk of collusion. If the co-trustees
collude, the assembler as beneficiary will not file suit to enforce the terms of the trust. Under
those circumstances, an analogy may be made to the broadening scope of the rules that
govern standing to enforce charitable trusts. Traditionally, an attorney general is the only
party with standing to enforce the terms of a charitable trust. However, recent proposals seek
to increase the number of parties available to file suit against the trustee for breach of trust.
For example, UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c), 7C U.L.A. (2000) provides that "[t]he settlor of a
charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust." The public is
the unstated beneficiary of the LPT in a manner that is similar to the way in which the public
benefits from charitable trusts. As a result, an argument may be made to permit "others" to
enforce the trust.2 10 See id. § 816(9).
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costs of maintenance for unoccupied properties and the property taxes due on
all properties held by the trust. Prospective tenants, of course, may hesitate to
rent a home on property with the knowledge that the property is presently
designated for development; the market of willing and able tenants might be
thin. Kelo, however, provides evidence that tenants can be found to lease
properties subject to acquisition by eminent domain in the near future. 211
Surprisingly, many of Fort Trumbull's residents at the time of the Supreme
Court decision were tenants who took up residence after the property owners
lost their challenge to New London's exercise of eminent domain in the
Connecticut Supreme Court.212 A thin market of potential tenants does not
mean that the market is nonexistent.
One group of individuals that might be interested in leasing the property
consists of the former owners of those properties. Former owners may be
interested in leasing the property for some period of time after selling the
property to obtain more time to locate a new home or business site. Leases
between the former owners and the LPT could be structured to end upon
termination of the LPT or at some mutually agreeable time prior to that point.213
Furthermore, the leases could include an option for former owners-now-tenants
to purchase properties upon termination of the LPT. Whatever the terms, the
leases could be finalized at the time of sale and incorporated by reference into
the land sale contracts. By leasing the properties, the former owner-now-tenant
saves money on property taxes that would otherwise have to be paid if the
tenant had fee simple to the property. For its part, the LPT saves money that
would need to be expended to maintain the property's physical structures and
prevent the vandalism that often accompanies empty structures. While many
former owners will not choose to remain in their former homes, the power to
lease trust property reflects the flexibility of the LPT and provides both former
owners and land assemblers with financial benefits if they opt to enter into a
post-title transfer lease.
Although the LPT will undoubtedly increase the cost of land assembly for
land assemblers and condemning authorities, increasing mandatory
expenditures provides local authorities with an incentive to recalibrate their
planning practices. At present, the availability of funding from sources other
than local taxpayers, chiefly federal and state funding, skews the cost-benefit
analysis in favor of exercising eminent domain in conjunction with
211 See Brooks & Busch, supra note 90, at 21-22; see also Avi Salzman, Homeowners
Settle, but Their Fighting Spirit Lives On, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at N5 (reporting that an
individual moved from Las Vegas to New London to support the homeowners "by paying
rent").2 12 See Brooks & Busch, supra note 90, at 21-22.
213 For example, the former owners and the assembler-co-trustee could enter into a
tenancy at will, which has no fixed duration and lasts only so long as both parties intend to
remain parties to the lease.
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redevelopment projects. 214 For example, federal funds played an instrumental
role in advancing GM's project in Poletown and "[w]ithout state funds, NLDC
[New London Development Corporation] would not have had any means of
financing the Fort Trumbull revival effort. '215 In Norwood, the private land
assembler agreed to reimburse the costs of land assembly incurred by the
condemning authority,216 which similarly distorts the financial costs of
redevelopment. The availability of funding from sources outside the local tax
base permits local authorities to make redevelopment decisions divorced from
financial constraints associated with local funding of projects; redevelopment
decision making is a gamble with what, in essence, is house money.
By contrast, the LPT's duty to protect trust property increases the financial
investment in the success of the project from the earliest planning stages. A
greater degree of financial accountability will be visited upon the condemning
authority and land assembler as co-trustees of the LPT; therefore, they may be
forced to place greater reliance on local financing for the project to progress. As
evidence of the impact of a change in funding source, local authorities that rely
on localized financing tools, such as tax increment financing, do not readily
employ the "acquire and destroy" strategy because the risk of reducing property
tax revenue exceeds the benefit of immediate destruction. 217 Even if federal and
state funding could be used to defray LPT costs, the amount required at the
outset would be ambiguous because the duration of the land assembly process is
speculative. As a result, local authorities and land assemblers would be forced
to marshal acquisition funds carefully to avoid running out of money, which
might compel the usage of local revenue streams. The LPT exchanges house
money for the local government's money in the redevelopment gamble, thereby
increasing fiscal accountability.
As a corollary to the impetus for improved planning spurred by local
funding sources, the cost of the LPT offers a partial correction to the incentive
to overuse eminent domain to assemble land.218 The fair market value standard
of "just compensation" often falls short of full indemnification for a property
owner's loss because it discounts subjective value of the property.219
2 14 William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal
Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 943-44.
215 Lefcoe, supra note 88, at 940.
2 16 Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d 381, 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
217 Lefcoe, supra note 88, at 940.
218 The correction is described as "partial" because LPT costs associated with the
duration of land assembly may or may not equal the subjective value attached to the property
by an owner that is uncompensated under the present fair market value standard.
2 1 9 See RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 83 (1985). Others have noted the compensatory shortfall. See, e.g., Lee Anne
Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 958 (subjective losses
represent an "uncompensated increment" of damages associated with eminent domain);
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (labeling subjective
losses as "demoralization costs").
[Vol. 72:4
KELO-STYLE FAILINGS
Consequently, the fair market value standard allows a condemning authority to
save money that it would otherwise have to spend to acquire title if the property
was on the open market and funnel those savings into the compulsory purchase
of other lands. The condemning authority in Kelo, for example, sought and
acquired title to one of the parcels at issue in the case even though it did not
have a clearly defined plan to use the parcel for the immediate construction of
the development.220 The financial outlay to support the purpose of the LPT,
however, is a disincentive to acquire more property than needed because doing
so only results in an increase in costs prior to breaking ground for the project.
The surplus generated by the under-compensation associated with a fair market
value standard of "just compensation" is likely to be used to comply with the
duties imposed on co-trustees of the LPT; therefore, less funding is available to
over-consume land.
The increased costs of the LPT have one additional, and maybe the most
important, salutary effect on the traditional land assembly process: combating
the risk to the public interest created by postponing productive use of property
until some point after title acquisition. Because the duration of the land
assembly process is unknown, a land assembler has an incentive to bargain
more aggressively for title to property in advance of litigation as a cost-saving
measure. To that end, a rational land assembler will increase the offers to
owners of desired properties. As a result, the land assembler may aggregate title
to necessary parcels in a shorter period of time and litigation, if needed, may
commence sooner rather than later as a property owner holds out or a land
assembler holds in. In either case, bargaining more aggressively and with
greater dispatch shortens the life of the LPT, which diminishes the window
during which changed circumstances may obstruct development. In sum, the
increased costs of the LPT create a positive feedback loop that promotes
voluntary transfers of title while preserving the structures on acquired
properties-both of which benefit the public interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Much of the post-Kelo clamor focused on the utility of Kelo-style takings
from a policy perspective.22 1 Because it is a procedural modification to the
process of land assembly, the LPT does not directly address the meta-utility of
Kelo-style takings. However, the LPT may serve as an indirect, albeit imperfect,
proxy for the social utility of the project for which the land is being assembled
under certain circumstances. 222 If the project is abandoned and no developer can
be enlisted to succeed to the position of co-trustee of the LPT, the probability
2 20 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 495 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221 See, e.g., Robert G. Dreher & John D. Echeverria, Kelo's Unanswered Questions:
The Policy Debate Over the Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development (2006),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GELPIReport-Kelo.pdf.
222The proxy is imperfect because construction might begin but the project might
ultimately turn out to be an economic failure.
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that the land assembler and condemning authority overestimated the
development potential of the site is high. Rather than incur the costs of
overestimation in the form of a barren field, the LPT preserves the property for
its pre-assembly usage. In the absence of a developer with a viable proposal for
development, the pre-assembly usage of the properties preserved by the LPT
best reflects the present social utility of those properties.
Ultimately, no mechanism of land assembly can prevent Kelo-style failings
under all circumstances. The process of land assembly will forever be
susceptible to unforeseen changes that threaten the prospects of development
after all of the necessary properties have been assembled. Nevertheless, the
private and statutory preference for voluntary transfers of title prior to eminent
domain generates risks that can be combined to a greater degree than is offered
under current law or other scholarly proposals. Indeed, the vacant lots in New
London and Norwood attest to the failure to protect the public interest in the
process of assembling land for redevelopment. But unlike the present bifurcated
process that relegates the public interest to the end of the assembly process, the
LPT protects the public interest throughout the duration of land assembly. The
LPT injects more of the "public" into the public-private partnership model of
land assembly; the scales of land assembly tilt away from the "private" end of
the land assembly scale to a position closer to equipoise.
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